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On September 14th, 1968, approximately 1,000 enraged inhabitants wielding
assorted makeshift weapons formed a lynch mob that brutally murdered four people and
injured three others in San Miguel Canoa, Mexico. According to the generally accepted
account, Canoa’s inhabitants feared that recently-arrived Universidad Autónoma de
Puebla employees, in town on a weekend mountain-climbing expedition, were in
actuality communist agitators threatening the town’s social order. The lynching in Canoa
received limited press coverage and was subsequently overshadowed by the much larger
government orchestrated Tlatelolco massacre that occurred in Mexico City, on October 2,
1968. While Tlatelolco remains an important historic event from late 1960s Mexico, the
Canoa lynching and its aftermath reveals powerful social tensions that enveloped rural
Mexico during the Cold War. These tensions not only contributed to the lynching but
also served as an engine that produced competing narratives about the incident and the
larger issues of community, power and memory.
I propose Canoa was not culturally isolated or separated as a traditional rural
community but intricately connected to mainstream Mexican politics, migration, and
culture. Canoa’s residents were deeply connected to the national political environment

presided over by President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and local and regional sociopolitical
concerns. These layers of political culture filtered into Canoa and were interpreted by the
town’s residents according to their unique historical experiences. By contextualizing the
Canoa lynching into the larger narrative of the Cold War as related to Mexico, I hope to
not only add to the historiography of the Díaz Ordaz and Luis Echeverría years but also
place Canoa into the greater narrative of 1968 and the student movement.
A later film about the lynching reshaped the historic memory of the events. The
film Canoa (Cazals, 1975) became the dominant public memory of the lynching. Due in
part to Cazals’ documentary-style production, this dramatic fictional depiction influenced
how Mexicans perceived the rural countryside during the Cold War, and sanitized the
memory of the Canoa lynching in a manner that reflected the policies of President Luis
Echeverría. This study focuses on the power of film representation in the production and
consumption of public memory.

Copyright © 2013, Kevin M. Chrisman

DEDICATION

For my family,
and to the friends, mentors, and
loved ones who helped me along the way.

vi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis would not have taken form without the dedicated assistance lent to me
by family, friends, mentors, colleagues, professors, archivists, and strangers both here in
the United States and in various parts of Mexico. I am indebted to their kindness,
patience, encouragement, and criticism. This project first developed in 2011 in Lincoln,
Nebraska during one of my frequent visits to the office of my adviser James Garza, who
asked me one morning the central question of my research: “What about Canoa?” I must
first take this opportunity to thank him for suggesting this wonderful topic, and for
guiding me through the steps required to produce my first major academic project.
I also benefited from the countless conversations and recommendations offered to
me while attending the 2012 Oaxaca Summer Institution, in Oaxaca, Mexico. I am
particularly thankful to Bill French, María L.O. Muñoz, Bill Beezley, Monica Rankin,
Gabriela Soto Laveaga, John Mraz, and Anne Rubenstein for their valuable insights of
Mexican cultural history. Their thoughtfulness helped prepare me for my first trip to the
archives. I am glad to finally acknowledge them.
I owe a special dedication to the various archivists and library staffs in Mexico
who provided much needed assistance and help locating sources. They also helped me
connect with other archives and gave me directions to navigate around Mexico City,
which I greatly appreciate. At the Archivo General de la Nación, I owe a special thanks
to José Zavala and the self-titled “archive rat” Linda Arnold for their invaluable support
in locating critically important documents and collections. I am indebted to their

vii
kindness. I must also acknowledge Antonia Rojas Ávila, the Head of Department of
Documentation, and the wonderful staff at the Filmoteca on the campus of the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. They went beyond their duties to provide
me an enormous amount of material, and an impromptu interview with film director
Felipe Cazals, who I also thank for his precious time.
My research was partially funded by a Valeda K. Wood Travel Fellowship from
the History Department at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. I am truly indebted to the
faculty members who assisted me in this project. I owe special thanks to William
Thomas III, Dawne Curry, Patrick Jones, Tim Mahoney, James Le Sueur, Gerald
Steinacher, Lloyd Ambrosius, Waskar Ari, Tim Borstelmann, Sandra Pershing, and Barb
Bullington for their constant support. I would also like to thank my thesis committee
member Sergio Wals. Many graduate students talked me through various parts of this
project, including Pablo Rangel, Luke Chennel, Rebecca Wingo, Jake Friefeld, Mikal
Brotnov, Brian Gribben, Robert Jordan, Brian Sarnacki, and Andy Wilson. Additional
thanks to Daron Olson, Theodore Weeks, Michael Torney, Alejandro Mendez, and
Marcelene García-Huerta.
At this time I wish to acknowledge my partner, Marisol García-Huerta, who very
graciously sacrificed her entire 2012 summer vacation to accompany me in the various
archives and reading rooms I visited in Mexico City and Puebla. She provided me much
needed humor, company, assistance, and translations. Unbelievably, she never
complained once about being bored, though I knew otherwise. There are not many
people as patient and understanding as she, and for this I must say gracias for everything.

viii
Of course, none of this could have been possible without the constant support of
my family. My parents, Christine and Michael, my grandmother Adeline, my sister Kate,
and brothers Eric and Ian believed in me and encouraged my interests in Mexican history.

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

vi

Table of Contents

ix

List of Figures

x

Introduction

10

Chapter 1: The Night of Machetes

21

Chapter 2: The Aftermath

47

Chapter 3: Visualizing and Remembering

80

Conclusion

104

References

113

x

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure
0.1

Page
Frame Enlargement from Canoa

86

10
INTRODUCTION
Pascual García and his young brothers awakened to a frightful chorus of shouting
from outside their home and the disturbing image of a man chopping down their front
door with an ax. The boys were crying as people from the infuriated crowd finally
breached the lone exit, a simple wood paneled door their father Lucas García García had
barricaded with a wooden pole. Their crying continued, especially after a man
approached their father with a machete in hand and delivered a sharp blow to his jugular.
His body slowly tumbled into a heap onto the dirt floor that quickly became permeated
with blood. 1 The crowd pelted his body using sticks and machetes until someone pointed
a shotgun at his chest, and ended his life in front of his wife and four children.
This macabre scene began the evening of September 14th, 1968, when
approximately 1,000 enraged inhabitants wielding machetes and shotguns, and other
assorted makeshift weapons formed a lynch mob that brutally murdered four people and
injured three others in San Miguel Canoa, Mexico. 2 According to the generally accepted
account, Canoa’s inhabitants feared that recently-arrived Universidad Autónoma de
Puebla (UAP 3) employees, in town on a weekend mountain-climbing expedition, were in
actuality communists agitators threatening the town’s social order. The lynching in
Canoa received limited press coverage and was subsequently overshadowed by the much
larger government orchestrated Tlatelolco massacre that occurred in Mexico City, on
October 2, 1968. Hundreds of demonstrators from the movimiento estudiantil (student
movement) were gunned down in the Plaza de Tres Culturas in that incident.
1

Guillermo Ochoa, “La Fiesta de la Sangre: Cuando Los Machetes se Dieron Gusto en Canoa,” ¡Siempre!
No. 1193, (May 1975), 14, Biblioteca Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, Distrito Federal.
2
Canoa, San Miguel Canoa, or San Miguel de Canoa all refer to the same town.
3
La Universidad Autónoma de Puebla changed its name in the 1990s to Benemérita Universidad
Autónoma de Puebla, BUAP.
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While Tlatelolco remains as the most important event from the late 1960s
Mexico, the Canoa lynching and its aftermath reveals powerful social tensions that
enveloped rural Mexico during the Cold War period. These tensions not only contributed
to the lynching but also served as an engine that produced competing narratives about the
incident and the larger issues of community, power and memory. Ultimately, the incident
would produce a powerful visual narrative that reinforced common tropes about rural
Mexico. By placing Canoa in the narrative of Cold War Mexico, I hope to not only add
to the historiography of the Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría years but also situate Canoa in an
environment directly connected to the pulse of Mexican mainstream society. Historical
evidence suggests Canoa repeatedly experienced periods of violence influenced by
episodes of national tension and unrest. The events in 1968, for example, represent the
third recorded lynching in Canoa’s history, with the others coinciding with major national
events in 1856 (La Reforma) and 1924 (The 1910 Revolution). 4 In many ways, Mexico’s
national policies and the tensions they produced were magnified in rural villages. Canoa
was certainly no exception. Exploring the role of community and its relationship with
power at both a local and national level works to decentralize the heavy focus of power
and history emanating from Mexico City.
This project draws heavily on research conducted during a summer research trip
to Mexico in 2012. The majority of documents and collections were obtained from the
Archivo General de la Nación (AGN) in Mexico City, and the Archivo General del
Estado de Puebla (AGEP). Valuable material was also obtained from the Biblioteca

4

Felipe Galvez, “San Miguel Canoa: Matanza en tres tiempos: 1856, 1924, 1968,” Proceso, Vol. 1143.
(Sept. 1998).
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Miguel Lerdo de Tejada, in Mexico City, and the Filmoteca on the campus of UNAM.
The latter entity provided a substantial amount of documents related to Canoa, the film
adaptation released in 1975 by director Felipe Cazals and screenwriter Tomás Pérez
Turrent. This film presented Mexican audiences with a dramatic fictional depiction of
the hiker’s nightmare. The film remains an intricate component of Canoa’s legacy, and a
powerful depiction of 1968 Mexico. I contend Canoa has become the official public
memory of the lynching. Due in part to Cazals’ documentary-style production, the film
influenced how Mexicans perceived the rural countryside during the Cold War, and
sanitized the memory of the Canoa lynching. Consumption of Canoa’s history through
film impacted how many Mexicans perceived and understood the lynching and their
cultural surrounding of the Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría years. 5 Analyzing the
development of Mexico’s public memory of the lynching provides a fascinating window
to explore the competing narratives created in the lynchings aftermath. Ultimately,
Cazals’ film transmitted the dominant historical memory of the events in Canoa, and
became a source in which people viewed the culture of rural Mexicans during the
presidency of Díaz Ordaz and the larger Cold War. Canoa’s parable also provided a
visual template for journalists and historians that filtered memory through Cazals’
version of events. The result is similar to the process of photocopying where the loss of
quality from the original image is never seen, yet the copied version continues to be
reproduced. My thesis attempts to move beyond Canoa and Cazals’ vision to explore
how these competing histories of the lynching became remembered or forgotten.

5

See Jerome de Groot, Consuming History: Historians and heritage in contemporary popular culture
(London: Routledge, 2009), 2.
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In order to construct a detailed narrative of the lynching, I have relied heavily on
oral history as remembered by victims and witnesses. This dependability is hindered by
the trickiness of memory. Most interviews were conducted shortly after Canoa was
released in Mexican theatres in 1975. The film created a renewed public interest into the
lynching and provoked historians and journalists to conduct interviews that were released
in prominent magazines, newspapers, and historical societies. These accounts described
in great detail various individual reflections of the lynching that when taken collectively
offer a broader perspective. They also reveal possible theories on what provoked the
lynching, and different perspectives from the dominant social actors. I have relied on
these interviews to present a richer narration than what concise top-down government and
newspaper reports describe. Depending on these interviews remains a tricky process, as
these memories, filtered through time and possibly altered by the film’s release, and
provided the only on-the-ground reports available.
Memory remains an issue to contend with in regards to the historical
reconstruction of events that took place after the lynching. Witnesses imagined and
reimagined their stories in order to make sense of the traumatic experiences they endured.
In some instances, survivor testimony varied substantially on detail, or remained mute on
certain portions. The passage of time inversely affected the memory retrieval process for
the principal victims. Predictably, various witness accounts produced multiple competing
narratives. As a result, the interview process itself comes into question, as the actual
structure, focus, and content presented to the reader packages the narrative in a certain
direction. Questions may arise concerning the validity of their story; however there is no
question their unique experiences are valuable and their recollections and opinions should
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not be discounted simply because of the passage of time. In fact, many crucial details
concerning the lynching and its immediate aftermath surfaced decades later in subsequent
interviews. To provide a more objective analysis, I have attempted to corroborate the
competing narratives with government reports and other historical evidence. Based on
my research, it appears that government reports I obtained from the AGN do not appear
in any available historical accounts that construct the Canoa lynching, which instead tend
to focus solely on eyewitness accounts or newspapers. 6 Newspaper records provide
another twist. Very few national newspapers covered the lynching or its aftermath,
which raises certain questions about the paucity of available information. Only a few
local newspapers in Puebla followed the events or aftermath in depth. Combining these
various angles will contribute to a more holistic view that incorporates the Canoa
lynching into the large context of the Cold War in Mexico.
While there remains to be written a comprehensive historical analysis of mob
violence and vigilante justice as related to Mexico, lynching scholarship has contributed
substantially in other geographical regions. 7 These studies explore the various regional,
racial, ethnic, economic, and political factors that influenced mob mentality,
participation, and support for lynchings over various time periods. Michael Pfeifer’s
analysis of lynchings in Wisconsin during the 19th Century suggests the relative decline
in public support for lynch law was influenced in part by the growth in police strength to
6

A collection of documents available at the AGN titled “San Miguel Canoa,” Versión Pública, were
assembled by a researcher in 2006. However, during my investigation, I have yet to uncover a historical
account of the lynching based on these primary sources. See citation 19.
7
See for example Ashutosh Varshney, ed., Collective Violence in Indonesia (Boulder: Lynn Rienner
Publishers, 2010); William D. Carrigan, ed., Lynching Reconsidered: New Perspectives in the Study of
Mob Violence (London: Routledge, 2008); Thomas E. Smith, “Reform and Empire: The British and
American Transnational Search for the Rights of Black People in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth
Centuries,” (PhD diss., University of Nebraska, 2006); W. Fitzhugh Brundage, Lynching in the New South:
Georgia and Virginia, 1880-1930 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1993).
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protect suspected criminals from the lynch parties. 8 In broader terms, one could argue
lynch mobs are interconnected and dependent on a binary relationship with state power
and their representatives. State control over the judicial process and effective law
enforcement practices inversely influences communal violence. Lynching parties may
otherwise believe vigilante justice offers a justifiable form of punishment when the state
appears absent in domestic affairs, and unable to adequately protect their community.
Canoa’s general lack of state power and police enforcement of criminal law produced a
social environment where many citizens felt the necessity to take the law into their own
hands to defend their community.
Mexico’s national Cold War policies were not exempt from effecting seemingly
unconnected rural peripheries in Mexico’s countryside. In many ways, these policies
were magnified in rural villages. Recent scholarship examines the binary relationship
between state formation and its link with the Mexican countryside. 9 As Jeff Rubin
argues, the Mexican state still struggles to incorporate rural communities that sustain a
unified grassroots opposition. In the case of Juchitán, an ethnically Zapotec city in
southern Mexico, the community was able to successfully repel Mexican state hegemony
and refashion its own autonomous power structure based on its long tradition of
radicalism and struggle against domination. As Rubin argues, the regime became
decentered, as national politics coexisted with a strong oppositional regional party. It can
be argued rural communities with traditionally conservative backgrounds are equally
exempted by the ambivalence of Mexico’s state formation albeit in different ways.
8

Pfeifer, Michael J. “Wisconsin’s Last Decade of Lynching, 1881-91: Law and Violence in the
Postbellum Midwest,” in Lynching Reconsidered: New Perspectives in the Study of Mob Violence, edited
by William D. Carrigan, 9 (London: Routledge, 2008).
9
See Jeffrey Rubin. Decentering the Regime: Ethnicity, Radicalism, and Democracy in Juchitán, Mexico
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1997).
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The lack of state power in rural communities afforded opportunities for localized
power brokers to fill the state’s void. As Monique Nuijten argues, these particular social
agents of power are ineffective at linking rural townspeople to the national bureaucratic
system. However, these agents form an image of an effective power broker that
understands the national “political-bureaucratic labyrinth” that is necessary for local
power to function and persist. These quasi-state actors play a role in fulfilling the
fantasies of a strong and powerful state. 10 Nuijten theorizes these reproductive regimes
of power are susceptible to insecurity about their own vulnerable position of power.
These fears normally cause irrational and unpredictable decision making, a proliferation
of fretful imaginings, conspiracy theories, and town gossip produced during moments of
conflict. 11 These symptoms of political vulnerability were quite evidence in Canoa.
Rural villagers are consciously aware of their position within a village power
structure as evident in instances of communal rebellion, violence, and homicide. Both
William Taylor and Luis González have presented detailed microhistories analyzing
small Mexican villages. Their work elucidates a tremendous amount about rural societies.
Both argue that Mexican villages were victimized by the big city, and felt culturally
isolated or separate from the outside world. 12 However, San Miguel Canoa was not
culturally isolated or separate as a traditional rural community. I argue it was intricately
connected to the mainstream through media, politics, migration, and culture. These
residents demonstrated, through their collected act of frustration, a deep connection to the
global Cold War, the national political environment under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz,
10

See Monique Nuijten, Power, Community, and the State: The Political Anthropology of Organisation in
Mexico (London: Pluto Press, 2003), 3.
11
Ibid.
12
William B. Taylor, Drinking, Homicide, and Rebellion in Colonial Mexican Villages (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1979), 153.
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and local and regional sociopolitical concerns. These layers of political culture filtered
into Canoa and were interpreted by the town’s residents according to their own historic
experiences. As James C. Scott argued, rural inhabitants seek an entitled state of living
based on the resources available within the village, often at the expense of social status
and autonomy. They understand the inequitable system they are a part of, and live
through this system in the precarious nature of gossip, envy, and the full knowledge they
pose a massive threat to the upper echelon. 13 In critical moments when the villager’s
livelihood feels threatened, they are susceptible to the same level of insecurity and
vulnerability as their political leaders.
Enrique Meza Pérez, the village priest in Canoa at the time of the 1968 lynching,
functioned as the town’s most prominent power broker and served as a moral and
political agent deeply connected to the local community and politically aligned with
regional and national governmental figures. 14 He provided valuable services for the
community that did not exist prior to his arrival in 1953, including electricity and
education. He also implemented a construction project that piped in potable water from
the nearby mountains. 15 Canoa’s predominantly agricultural society contained fewer than
7,200 inhabitants in 1968, of which a large majority were indigenous people who spoke
primarily Náhuatl. 16 Census records from 1960 indicated of 5,051 inhabitants, 3,090
were classified “monolingual indigenous.” 17 Like most small, conservative rural

13

James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 5.
14
Declarations from the priest Enrique Meza Pérez, in Jesus García Olvera, “Canoa, una película que
deforma la realidad de lo que pasó,” Impacto, no. 1361, (Mar.1976), 24. A photograph shows Meza shaking
hands with Puebla’s governor Aarón Merino Fernández.
15
Olvera, Impacto, 25.
16
Olvera, Impacto, 24.
17
Osvaldo Romero Melgarejo, La Violencia Como Fenómeno Social, 90.
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communities in Mexico, the local church acted as the most powerful social institution. As
a religious and political figurehead, Meza fulfilled the role as the local intermediary that
linked Canoa’s inhabitants to regional power centers and the larger Mexican state.
Examining the Canoa lynching and its aftermath reveals Meza felt vulnerable about his
power and felt susceptible to insecurities fueled by local, regional, and national tension.
Meza demonstrated these insecurities at many critical moments before, during, and after
the lynching. His irrational decision making and examples of his erratic behavior raise
suspicions concerning his level of participation the night of the lynching.
Canoa’s power structure depended upon strong public support for the town’s main
social institution, the village church. Like most small towns in Mexico, the church
represents the vital heart of communal activity. For the largely indigenous population in
Canoa, the church centered as place for worship, socialization, marriage, communication,
and cultural life. Enrique Meza retained the role as village leader and offered spiritual
guidance in the daily affairs of his followers. In general, village priests can obtain an
enormous amount of influence and power. In Mexico, politically elected officials may
not run consecutive elections. Priests, on the other hand, are appointed by ecclesiastical
authorities, and are not limited by terms of office. Therefore, village priests have the
ability to gain power by allying with strong political circles that can also use a priest’s
communal influence to gain support. Thus, the priest fills the critical role as a state actor
in rural spaces where the national state regime cannot extend its formal influence.
Canoa provides a perfect example of the strategic relationship between the state
and the traditional power structure. Enrique Meza played an intricate role in the
village’s decision making processes, both religious, politically, and socially. In tandem
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with village mayor, Martín Arce, the priest acted as a self-appointed power broker with
backing from the state but without state power. Meza projected an image of his power in
Canoa. After the lynching, Meza’s portrait of state authority revealed a paper dragon
when he requested Puebla’s assistance from Puebla’s military headquarters. However,
Meza used his public connections and prominent position to sway local political
decisions, increasing his role in Canoa’s communal affairs. Meza’s power was derived
and also dependent on the village voice that supported his social institution. The
religious supporters of Canoa offered tacit approval and a continuation of support for the
priest’s policies and leadership position in town. 18

1968 represents a defining moment in Mexico’s post-revolutionary history, a
period marked by substantial social and cultural change fueled by industrial development
beginning in the 1950s and 1960s. Mexico’s import-substitution industrialization
economic policy gave rise to the emergence of a middle class and a new consumer
culture. 19 Material gain became the national signifier of development. However, this
came at the enormous expense of Mexico’s urban and rural poor who remained relatively
untouched by the so called ‘miracle’ period. Their disaffection and isolation from the
fruits of capitalism, coupled by the denial of democratic opportunities under the
authoritarian Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) ruling party, stirred lingering
resentment that gave birth to a flourishing counterculture. 20 Sustained economic growth
filtered through a political climate of subordination under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz
18

Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1970), 38.
Eric Zolov. Refried Elvis: The Rise of the Mexican Counterculture (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1999), 1-5.
20
Zolov, Refried Elvis, 1-5.
19

20
and the ruling party. 21 During the sexenio of Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970), Mexico set
preparations to demonstrate to the world its advances in economic and industrial
modernization when it hosted the Summer Olympics in 1968. However, behind the
façade of the Mexican “miracle” existed mounting political and social tensions, and an
escalation of state government repression directed against dissident students and other
young people from the middle class who questioned the role of government, and the
authoritative nature of the presidency. 22 The patriarchal framework of the PRI sustained
major challenges beginning in the 1950s by an exuberant counterculture that questioned
societal norms and sought to transform the authoritarian system. 23 The revolutionary
party experienced a political crisis, with its power openly challenged and its very
legitimacy questioned. The rise of the movimiento estudiantil or student movement,
provoked serious challenges to the authoritarian status quo, and questioned the ruling
party’s political legitimacy on a national stage. The movement demonstrated an ability
to independently organize and protest against vast political corruption and societal
failures. This period of diverse cultural change was a significantly tense moment in
Mexican history, especially in the rural countryside where social anxieties were
magnified. It was these social anxieties that led to the events on that September night.

21

Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, trans. Hank Heifetz (New York: HarperCollins, 1997),
681-686.
22
Zolov, Refried Elvis, 8.
23
Zolov, Refried Elvis, 5.
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CHAPTER 1: THE NIGHT OF MACHETES
On Saturday September 14th, 1968, Julián González, Roberto Rojano, Jesús
Carillo, Ramón Gútierrez, and Miguel Flores Cruz, employees from La Universidad
Autónoma de Puebla (UAP), traveled on a weekend hiking excursion to a dormant
volcano named “La Malinche” or La Malintzin. The men planned on celebrating
Mexican Independence Day in the mountains, following a common tradition for urban
Mexican families who often travel to the country on weekends. Their ambitious
adventure stalled almost immediately. Another group of employees who had initially
agreed to join them cancelled at the last minute, delaying their departure until late
afternoon. By the time the five young men finally bought their tickets and departed from
the bus terminal in Puebla, it was 5:30pm and the sky looked threatening with rain. 1
The UAP crew exited the bustling capital of Puebla in a bus filled to capacity
traveling across a newly completed highway that connected the capital to San Miguel
Canoa, the town at the skirt of La Malinche. 2 It is believed that in colonial times, two
pre-Hispanic irrigation channels flanked Canoa on both sides which friars once traversed
by canoe to spread their evangelism to the predominantly indigenous community. The
friars named the town after San Miguel, their patron saint, and the device that facilitated
their work. 3 Aboard the bus, the other passengers were probably lower class farmers and
charcoal venders returning from the busy commercial district Mercado Hidalgo, and day
1

Ruben Osorio, El Linchamiento de San Miguel Canoa, 14 September 1968: Documento Para La Historia
de la Barbarie en Mexico, (Chihuahua: La Sociedad Chihuahuense de Estudios Historicos, 1976), 9
(hereafter cited simply as Osorio, El linchamiento); See also, Guillermina Meaney, Canoa: El Crimen
Impune (México: Editorial Posada, 1977), 119.
2
Tomás Pérez Turrent, Canoa: Memoria de un hecho vergonzoso: La historia, la filmación, el guión
(Puebla: Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 1984), 10.
3
Elsa R. de Estrada, “Ecos de un Linchamiento en el Pueblo de las Bocinas,” Contenido (June 1976), 7879.
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laborers returning from the municipal textile industries of Puebla. 4 Contented by finally
starting their adventure, the employees collectively rejoiced and sang to the great
irritation of a man who told them to shut up. From the bus windows, the urban
adventurers probably imagined the landscape to be particularly dreary and mundane. Just
beyond the endless rows of cornstalks, the trash-laden grass, and taut electric wires, La
Malinche, the destination for the weekend adventurers, loomed amongst the cloudy sky.
The bus dropped the men off in the small town underneath the mountain.
Around 6:00pm, a torrential downpour engulfed Canoa and indefinitely
suspended the hiker’s excursion. 5 The hikers immediately sought shelter from the rain in
a nearby store. The threatening weather did not perturb their ambition to climb La
Malinche. With ample time to return to Puebla, the men decided to wait out the storm for
several more hours. By evening, the downpour continued, but the adventurers
unwavering determination provoked them to ask the storeowner if he had an available
room for lodging. The storeowner declined to afford them lodging based on the limited
space he could provide them. However, he gave the men a suggestion to consult with the
local priest, Enrique Meza Pérez or Canoa’s municipal president Martín Pérez Arce for
available lodging. 6 The men heeded the storeowner’s advice and visited the local
Franciscan church.
The towering church spires were visible just north from their current location at
the store and its close proximity contributed to their decision to venture there to ask the

4

Osvaldo Romero Melgarejo. La Violencia Como Fenómeno Social: El Linchamiento en San Miguel
Canoa,Puebla (Universidad Autónoma de Tlaxcala, 2006), 116.
5
“San Miguel Canoa,” Versión Pública, Dirección Federal de Seguridad (hereafter DFS), Foja 1, Archivo
General de la Nación, Mexico City (hereafter AGN).
6
Osorio, El linchamiento, 10.
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priest for room in the church. No evidence suggests the men ever attempted to locate
Pérez Arce. González and Gútierrez went searching for batteries needed for their
flashlights, a major indication to their lack of preparation for their trip. Flores Cruz,
Carillo, and Rojano departed for the church. As the trio approached one of two church
entrances, the group encountered three or four inhabitants posted outside like sentries.
They wore overcoats and sombreros as protection from the rain and had their faces
completely covered. 7 The UAP men asked to converse with the priest. At that moment,
one villager revealed a shotgun concealed under his overcoat and pointed the barrel at
Carillo. The villager threatened the men to scram or face the impending consequences. 8
The frightening gesture afforded the trio little alternative but to seek temporary shelter
provided at the store they had just departed from. Meanwhile, after securing their
batteries, González and Gútierrez walked hastily in the torrential downpour towards the
church but went to a different entrance. They did not encounter hostile villagers.
Instead, they met with the village priest, Enrique Meza Pérez.
During their brief interview with the priest, Meza asked González and Gútierrez
for identification, in which both identified themselves as employees at the UAP. After
hearing their university affiliation, the priest immediately denied their request for
lodging. 9 Meza then returned to the parish, apparently overcome by an illness that forced
him to lie down in his quarters. 10 The priest’s quick rejection to their request provided
González and Gútierrez the same discouraging alternative but to return to the rainstorm
and take shelter in the local store. Reflecting about this encounter years later, Flores
7
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Cruz believed his friends had committed a crucial error by stating their affiliation with
the UAP, discerning his full awareness of the dangers of being associated in any way to
the large scale student movement in Puebla and Mexico City. 11
Evidence suggests this relatively brief encounter with the village priest was in
fact the pivotal moment that permanently transformed the weekend adventure into an
impending nightmare. The enormous magnitude of this event requires a diverging
analysis crucially overlooked in the generally accepted narrative that does not take into
consideration the local political situation in Canoa. Government security reports indicate
that just days prior to the UAP men’s arrival, a group of student activists from the UAP
School of Economics visited Canoa. The students held a political rally in town to
generate support for the university-wide student strikes.
In all likelihood, the UAP School of Economics students wanted to link with La
Central Campesina Independiente – (CCI), the Independent Farmers Syndicate. In the
1960s, the CCI developed a considerable following in Puebla, especially in areas around
Canoa, including Cholula and Tehnacán. CCI organizers successfully pressured state
authorities to address and find solutions for peasant agricultural problems. The PRI,
Mexico’s ruling party, felt particularly threatened by the farmer collective’s
developments and the political inroads they made in Puebla. One internal PRI document
warned of the CCI’s “drastic means” to raise support for their cause, and their “constant
danger of proliferation” that threatened the PRI’s political hegemony. 12 In Canoa, the
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CCI held considerable support among resident farmers, much to the dismay of the ruling
PRI power structure and Enrique Meza. 13
In 1968, Canoa’s internal political situation stood starkly divided between those
that supported the priest Enrique Meza and the PRI, and the local CCI. 14 Historical
evidence suggests Enrique Meza often used his religious sermons to publically criticize
and condemn the CCI and referred to these local supporters as lazy individuals who did
not want to work. 15 Other resident’s remember Meza demonizing the CCI supporters as
communists, linking the local CCI directly with the larger national threats of communist
subversion. 16 Other historical evidence suggests Padre Meza inculcated his pulpit with
fear that one day men would arrive to rob San Miguelito, the patron saint watching over
their community. 17 This potential theft was not an unprecedented claim in Mexican
history, especially in small agricultural communities susceptible to local fears and clerical
anxiety. 18 This negative portrayal discouraged many local CCI supporters from attending
Meza’s sermons. Meza further ostracized those absent from church by denouncing them
as “loose,” indicative to Meza’s considerable influence in Canoa, and his ability to
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centralize his power by demanding strict religious and political conformity by the town’s
residents. 19
When the UAP School of Economics activists visited Canoa in early September,
certain sectors of Canoa’s population took exception to their arrival. It remains uncertain
if the student group received any public support for Canoa’s local CCI or other residents.
However, some residents alleged these students hoisted a red and black flag on Canoa’s
“national insignia,” (en el sitio de la Insignia Nacional) probably a centrally located
flagpole. 20 Astonishingly, this allegation paralleled an event that occurred just days prior
on August 27, 1968, in Mexico City’s Zócalo, when a student demonstrator lowered the
Mexican flag and replaced it with a red and black strike flag. 21 During this
demonstration, members from the crowd entered Mexico City’s National Cathedral and,
with permission from church authorities, rang the church bells. Undoubtedly, these
events demonstrated the student movement’s strength in reclaiming these symbolic public
spaces. However, many Mexicans later felt appalled by these actions and viewed the
incident with the flag and the ringing of the church bells in particular as public
desecrations against Mexico’s symbolic institutions. These perceptions were shaped
largely in part by a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign carried out a few days
later by the ruling government party, the PRI. 22
Television commercials, radio announcements, and widely distributed flyers
around Mexico City shared Díaz Ordaz’s public declarations, that “Mexico has been
19
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desecrated.” The president accused “a mob incited by the communists committed two
infamous outrages against us.” He depicted the demonstrators as “urban guerrilla
communists” who “forcibly entered” the national Cathedral, “desecrating the high altar
and momentarily seizing the sacred building and national monument.” Díaz Ordaz
continued on, describing the red and black strike flag as a “communist flag” waving on
the central flagpole in the Zócalo, where “only our tricolor flag is entitled to fly.” Díaz
Ordaz’s highly nationalistic statement ended with a provocative affirmation that millions
of Mexicans who believe in God and love their country condemned these egregious acts
and insults. In connecting the Mexican student movement with recent international
developments involving communist movements, Díaz Ordaz stated, “We reject the
Communists without a country and without faith. Save our Mexico. Our nation will
never be Czechoslovakia or Cuba.” 23 The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August
20, 1968 was certainly fresh in everyone’s minds when Díaz Ordaz made his passionate
denunciation of the protestors who were also linked to the revolutionary tendencies of
Ernesto “Che” Guevara and the Cuban Revolution of 1959.
This wave of government propaganda extended to Mexico’s regional peripheries
and clearly played a major influence in the accusations levied against the students from
the UAP School of Economics who visited Canoa. In all probability, the UAP activists
never possessed a red and black flag, or insinuated any of the supposed actions levied
against them. However, the allegation itself indicates Mexico’s rural countryside felt
deeply connected to the national political tensions emanating from Mexico City. The
government sponsored propaganda program launched against the students protestors in
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the Zócalo penetrated into rural communities and deeply affected the attitudes and
opinions of everyday Mexicans who connected events in the big city with their own. The
national demonization of student protestors combined with Enrique Meza’s denunciation
of local CCI supporters undoubtedly affected the opinions of some residents in Canoa
when the students from the UAP School of Economics arrived in town.
Significantly, government reports also alleged the School of Economics students
robbed some animals and looted from a local store during their time in Canoa. 24 It
remains uncertain whether these or any other allegations contain any amount of
legitimacy beyond hearsay and speculation. It is extraordinarily difficult to envision a
group of middle-class university students as expert cattle rustlers. More problematic is
imagining their attempt to transport the livestock back to Puebla. However, by moving
beyond mere speculation and by contextualizing why these specific types of accusations
were stated elucidates the lingering social and economic frustrations felt among the
residents of Canoa.
Throughout Mexico’s rapid modernization and transformative economic period
known as the Mexican “miracle,” Canoa’s peasant farmers suffered from crop failures
and severe hunger due to a combination of improper crop rotation and cultivation
techniques. 25 According to anthropologist Osvaldo Romero Melgarejo, these problems
devastated Canoa’s local economy that depended upon domestically cultivated
agriculture. These severe economic problems persisted into the 1960s and deeply
effected peasant farmers. Canoa’s migrant trade laborers also felt the economic pinch. In
24
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1968, Puebla’s textile industry suffered from an economic crisis that forced many
manufacturers to close their doors and layoff their workers. This affected a large sector
of Puebla’s population, and inevitably affected migrant laborers from Canoa who sought
work in the state capital to support their families. 26 In Canoa, a tiny ruling class
controlled the agricultural sector, and designed an economic system that levied taxes
against domestic animals and property. This system disproportionately affected the
predominantly agrarian farming community and further depressed the financial income
for some farmers. A small group of local strongmen, caciques, monopolized the pulque
industry, the alcoholic beverage made from the fermented agave plant. These pulqueros
controlled an enormous amount of power, and concentrated their wealth at the expense of
regional farmers. 27 These caciques enjoyed full cultural, political, and religious backing
by their chief ally and local power broker, Enrique Meza Pérez. 28
The chieftainship of caciques dominated the region by using a system of political
and economic corruption specifically targeting rural farmers. These caciques hired
pistoleros or armed gunmen, who organized an intricate criminal system that rustled
cattle from local farmers. 29 This system of political corruption deeply effected everyday
residents in Canoa during the 1960s. Misery and famine compounded with the
overwhelming political depravity of the time. These anxieties fueled a cauldron of
mounting social anxiety boiling in Canoa. The School of Economics political activists
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from the UAP became a convenient scapegoat for Canoa’s residents to release their pent
up frustrations.
Strong religious devotion remains a cultural trademark of Puebla, as evident by
the number of religious organizations that often shared strong political connections with
the ruling party. In the 1960s, this included the Christian Family Movement that shared
political ties with the National Action Party (PAN), and groups called The Students (Las
Cursillistas) whom the PRI indicated were the “best propagators” of political slogans for
the high clergy in Puebla. 30 Documents indicate the PRI shared strong ties with Puebla’s
clergy, who were bitterly anticommunist and felt very concerned with liberal-leaning
universities who they felt needed to be coopted into their party. These groups likely
contributed to the regional fears of communism.
Canoa’s inhabitants were not politically or culturally isolated from these national
events and in fact were direct participants and deeply connected to the national pulse
emanating from Mexico City. Evidence suggests these national fears were filtered
through the traditional church power structure in Canoa, led by Enrique Meza.
According to Serafín Flores Manzano who lived in Canoa and used to frequent Meza’s
church, the priest used to tell his pulpit, “When communist arrive you all have to know
what you need to do.” 31 Meza’s warnings indicate major insecurities about his position
as a religious figurehead. His sentiment echoed the growing national anxieties which he
knowingly funneled into his pulpit as a measure to protect his power. This certainly fed
local tensions Canoa’s residents held for outsiders and in particular, student political
organizers.
30
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Rural Mexicans also felt pressured by national economic policies that
disproportionately targeted the rural countryside during Mexico’s “Miracle” period.
During this period of sustained economic development and expansive industrial
production, Mexico experienced a dazzling annual growth rate of six percent for a twenty
year time period. 32 Mexico’s industrial development fueled the growth of factories in
large cities, pushing many workers from the countryside to pursue jobs in the big city. In
order to feed the rapidly urbanized workforce, the Mexican government instituted food
subsidies that devalued commodity prices, crippling the income of rural farmers. The
sacrifice of the rural countryside gave birth to Mexico’s middle-class and fueled a
thriving consumer culture. Yet, this apparent economic success came at a tremendous
expense to rural Mexicans who were adversely affected by these national economic
policies and pushed into economic decline. In the mid-1960s, food production began to
decline and loan guarantees to ejidos dropped sharply. Price guarantees for grains
dropped 25 percent from 1964 and 1970. 33 Díaz Ordaz responded to the growth of rural
tensions by slowing land distribution. Real life wages decreased during this time period
for rural peasants and domestic laborers. 34 For some rural Mexican farmers, the real
miracle involved surviving decades of abject poverty.
The accusations brought forth against the UAP student protestors suggest a direct
link between national political fears and local socioeconomic problems. Many residents
from Canoa felt frustrated and angered by the system of corruption within their
community. These tensions mixed with the national fears of communism and the student
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movement in general. As William Taylor observed, indigenous communities under stress
from external threats often channel their frustrations and aggression outward, often
towards outsiders. 35 When the young student activists from the UAP School of
Economics visited Canoa in early September, 1968, some residents most likely viewed
the urban outsiders with suspicion and contempt and connected their presence with the
fears and frustrations mounting in their society. The residents funneled their anger at a
group of outsiders already publically demonized in the national press. The UAP students
became convenient scapegoats for some residents of Canoa to divert attention from the
real political and social struggles in their community. Cattle rustling and petty shoplifting
are also examples of crimes typically committed by individuals out of financial
desperation. Farmers already struggling to support their families were further victimized
by overt corruption and banditry. Thus, Canoa’s inhabitants were deeply connected with
Mexico’s national currents and felt economically chastised and abandoned by a system of
government that did not address their concerns.
The UAP employees visiting Canoa had inadvertently stepped into a cauldron of
social angst kindled by years of economic and political frustration and mounting social
fears of cultural change. Unbeknownst to González and Gútierrez, identifying
themselves with the UAP produced significant alarm for Enrique Meza. The priest was
undoubtedly familiar with the recent events in Mexico City’s Zócalo just weeks prior. As
a religious leader in a deeply conservative community, it is likely Meza viewed the red
and black flag incident in Mexico City as a national desecration, in line with the message
extolled by Díaz Ordaz. The events from the week prior involving the activists from the
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UAP School of Economics may have strengthened Meza’s insecurities about the threat of
local insurrection. Meza might have imagined the threat of communism had literally
knocked on his door.
Meza held a considerable amount of power as head of Canoa’s largest social and
religious institution. His intricate connection with communal affairs made him the
preeminent moral and political authority many inhabitants undoubtedly respected. Meza
declared years later Canoa’s residents “all obeyed me and respected me.” 36 Therefore,
his decision to deny the young men lodging sent a powerful message to Canoa’s residents
that the groups of young outsiders were not welcome guests of the church or the larger
community. This event might have provoked some residents to view the priest’s decision
as a formidable warning to other residents. It remains unclear who instructed the armed
inhabitants to be posted outside the church entrance or whether they stood there on their
own accord. The chronology of events seems to indicate certain members of the
community already felt threatened by the men’s arrival even before their meeting with
the priest.
Despite being hampered by the continuous rain, threatened by the barrel of a
shotgun, and denied lodging by Padre Meza, these setbacks did not immediately provoke
enough consternation among the men to gather their belongings and leave. The men
reunited briefly in the store across the center plaza before being told to leave by the store
owner who was about to close. 37 The crew eventually found temporary solace in Pascual
Romero Pérez’s store located on the main road into Canoa. The store contained Canoa’s
36
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lone caseta telefónica, a telephone booth that afforded the men an opportunity to call for
a ride. However, no evidence suggests they contemplated phoning anyone. Instead, the
men lingered around and talked about their recent experience at the church.
González shrugged off the standoffish behavior they received as typical for
communities like Canoa. 38 His comment sheds light on a created cultural separation
between the emerging modern Mexico that he was a part of, and the traditional, rural
Mexico often associated with indigenous people. These are the common tropes
associated with Mexico’s countryside, which often depicts Indians as hostile, potentially
violent, untrustworthy, and suspicious of outsiders. When people encounter new
landscapes, they often have a preconceived notion in their heads of what it is like. It is
possible González and the others created an image of Canoa and its residents according to
their own personal standards or based on these common tropes associated with
indigenous communities.
In the case of Canoa, two competing versions of Mexico collided together. Both
poblanos and Canoa’s inhabitants likely viewed each other as culturally separated
entities. Viewed from within their confines in Puebla’s rapidly modernizing society, the
UAP men probably viewed Canoa as the rural example of the town that progress had
forgotten, as a closed off community unwelcoming to outsiders. Yet, Canoa’s residents
were not exempt from the growing political tension and profound cultural transformation
occurring right before their eyes in Puebla and Mexico City. Most young middle class
youths and student from universities were part of La Onda, the wave and cultural
awakening. Clothing, language, hair styles and music were all extensions of this new
38
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counterculture forming in Mexico. 39 Thus, when the urban adventurer’s entered Canoa,
their very style, actions, and mannerisms expressed and represented a negative perception
of their social status and cultural values as Mexicans.
Meanwhile, to brighten the dampened mood, Miguel Flores Cruz put a peso into
the Rocola jukebox. The men danced and sang to typical ranchero songs. They snacked
on tortas, sardines, and refreshments and after some conversation, decided to finally
abandon their grand excursion. They imagined salvaging their weekend together by
returning to Puebla to visit their friend Panchito who owned a ranch on the city’s
outskirts. 40 This optimism faded quickly when the owner Don Pasqual Romero informed
the excursionists that the last available bus back to Puebla had just departed, effectively
leaving the men stranded. 41 The owner indicated the only other mode of transportation—
other than walking for hours in the rain—was by taxi. According to Pascual, taxis
normally arrived in Canoa with passengers but returned to the capital empty. 42
As the storm continued, a bus arrived into Canoa dropping off its last passengers
who entered Don Pascual’s store. The bus had made its last stop and did not return to
Puebla. The passengers were Pedro García, his two nieces María and Josefina de los
Angeles, and a young man named Odilón Sánchez, a painter from Mexico City’s
Olympic Village and boyfriend to Josefina. González was probably nervous about the
possibility of being stranded and approached Pedro García and explained their gloomy
situation. Pedro’s friendly attitude was a welcome relief to the downtrodden vacationers.
He indicated that his brother Lucas García lived approximately 300 meters from Canoa’s
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central plaza where he intended to stay for the night. 43 Pedro offered the men room at his
brother’s house for the night, and even offered to join them on their hiking excursion the
next morning. 44 The offer sounded extraordinary. Despite their perpetual bad luck and
unfriendly welcome by Canoa’s residents, the opportunity to prolong the men’s adventure
seemed tempting, especially when they considered their bleak alternatives. Still, they
took a quick vote on whether to stay, resulting in a 3-2 decision in favor of extending
weekend adventure. Ironically and most unfortunately, the two dissenting voters who
wanted to return to Puebla never had the opportunity to do so. 45
As the UAP men finished their drinks and walked to Lucas García’s house, a local
resident and member of the CCI, a group of inhabitants shadowed them until they
reached their destination. 46 According to one eyewitness, these residents returned to the
church and alerted the priest, Enrique Meza Pérez. 47 The UAP men entered García’s
small one-room shack and exchanged pleasantries with his wife Tomasa and their four
young children. Near the zócalo, word spread quickly that the suspicious outsiders
seeking shelter at García’s home were allegedly the same students from the UAP School
of Economics that held the political rally in town just days prior. 48 Certain residents
organized direct action against the young outsiders. It is reasonable to suspect only a
handful of individuals participated with the initial planning stages of the violence.
Possibly acting with the approval of the town’s priest, Enrique Meza, these perpetrators
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harnessed Canoa’s social tensions and fears of communism as a mechanism to launch a
communal attack on the suspicious outsiders.
Around 8:30 pm, the storm finally subsided enough for Odilón, Miguel, and the
girls to climb Lucas’ terrace. The group comingled and gazed upon the lights emanating
from the city capital. Around 10:00 pm, the group heard an explosion that might have
been a gunshot. The church bells started ringing in an alarming, methodical cacophony.
Inside the house, Lucas prophetically recognized the bell toll signaled someone’s death. 49
Moments later, the men overheard two distinct voices shouting in Náhuatl and Spanish,
blared from Canoa’s megaphone system. Various narratives offer conflicting
interpretations as to what was actually shouted. 50 Miguel Flores Cruz heard the Spanish
speaker warning Canoa’s residents that the town had been infiltrated by agitators,
students, communists, and thieves. 51 Another report indicates the woman speaking
mexicano stated, “Wake up, people! The communist have come and they are killing the
priest!” 52 The warnings deliberately invoked fear to stimulate an immediate response
from Canoa’s residents. The vocal threats mentioned students and thieves, confirming
the UAP employees had been confused for the student activists who visited Canoa a week
prior.
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Newspaper records indicate Andrea Arce and Miguel Monarca operated the
loudspeaker and provoked the inhabitants. 53 These two individuals timed their verbal
warnings to coincide with the church bells, suggesting multiple parties coordinated the
general alarm. The central planners recognized the necessity to address the larger
community by communicating in two languages to warn as many residents as possible.
The excursionists felt unsettled by the unusual public reaction but did not initially believe
the frantic loudspeaker pronouncements had anything to do with them. 54
However, a lynch mob had formed under the church spires carrying torches,
shotguns, machetes, and other various makeshift weapons. The mob contained roughly
1,000 men, women, and children as young as eight years old. 55 The tolling church bells
and blaring megaphones continued to incite the fearful inhabitants who gathered near the
central plaza to defend Canoa. 56 Once gathered there, the megaphone announced the
location of the supposed communists and thieves, directing the mob to Lucas García’s
house. The angry crowd quickly surrounded the one-room building, shouted obscenities
and demanded Lucas turn over the communists the mob wanted to burn. 57 Lucas and his
brother valiantly defended the employees and refused to hand them over, barricading the
lone exit. The brothers desperately tried to calm the unruly mob and explained that the
men from the UAP were just employees and not students. Their efforts to defuse the
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situation failed, and their defiance to the mob’s orders only aggravated their rage. Inside
the house, Lucas’ family and the UAP employees were absolutely terrified. Gonzalez
and the others searched for hiding places within the house, but there was no escape. 58
The wooden door began to give way to the ax blows. García defended himself with a
weapon and met the enraged intruders at the entrance. 59 The mob immediately attacked
García, who received a machete blow to his jugular and a shotgun blast to his chest. He
died immediately in front of his wife and children. An elderly man approached Carillo
and delivered an ax blow to his stomach that knocked the air out of him. As Carillo
doubled over onto the floor, the old man leaned over his body and whispered that he was
going to kill him, and make him pay. 60
The hysterical mob ignored the hopeless pleas from the UAP men who tried in
vain to clarify their status as employees and not students from the UAP. With gun barrels
pointed towards them, the UAP employees were tied together and bounded by ropes
around their necks. The mob pulled them like livestock, and led them like beasts into the
open, presenting the frightened men to the enraged onlookers. 61 The form of public
humiliation and dehumanization suggests certain perpetrators wanted to methodically
punish the victims in a manner that held symbolic importance to the larger community.
Parading the UAP employees as domesticated animals symbolized the frustrations certain
residents felt to the severe economic and political corruption and the problems with cattle
rustlers. Yet the mob also demanded the UAP men hand over their stash of propaganda,
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convinced they were communist agitators and perhaps the same student activists from the
week prior. This indicates the lynch mob consisted of individuals who joined with
multiple personal motivations spurred by their own anxiety towards communism and the
frantic announcements from the megaphone. In essence, the lynch mob consisted of
individuals affected by multiple layers of social and political tension.
Gutiérrez and Carillo tried to escape the García household but managed only a
few feet before being bludgeoned to death by the crowd. Medical examiners later
indicated the men died after receiving multiple machete blows to their heads and neck. 62
Tomasa García and Lucas’ two nieces were not excluded from the collective violence.
They received physical attacks from the lynch mob despite not having any connection
with the UAP, banditry, or communism. Tomasa credited her survival to her children,
which she sheltered in her arms along with her nine month old baby. 63 Incredibly, Pedro
García escaped from the house completely undetected, presumably by mixing into the
crowd and confused among the mob as another assailant. 64 Upon exiting the house,
González received a blow that knocked him out. He awoke to find the bodies of his
friends dead and swollen from the attack that had ended their lives.
Rojano and González continued to trudge along, pulled like animals with ropes
leashed around their necks. They received a relentless onslaught to their bodies by the
crowd’s sticks, stones, feet, and fists. Their stamina finally diminished under pain and
exhaustion and they collapsed on a small bridge during their forced march back to the
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central plaza. 65 As they lay on the ground, a few individuals poured gas on them and
threatened to burn them alive. According to one account, the lynching party only wanted
to wait for the victims to surrender in death so they could take their bodies to a local
ravine and burn their corpses to destroy any vestige to their existence. 66
Lynch mobs who burn a victim’s body following an execution are continuing a
process in the public spectacle, further humiliating and physically destroying the proper
and natural form of the body. Destroying human characteristics also erases the memory
of the victims. Burning corpses can be viewed through a religious lens as well as an act
to rid a social evil from a community. However, in the case of Canoa, the perpetrators in
the lynching party acted rather hastily, responding to a perceived and imminent threat to
their community. Burning the UAP employees would have likely been an instinctual
reaction to destroy the evidence that would link the perpetrators to the crime they were
committing.
A defiant Flores Cruz refused to succumb to the bombardment he received from
the angry mob. Amazingly, after three machete blows to his head, he remained standing
and lost all sensation to the pain he continued to endure. Cruz credited his survival to his
practice of dynamic tension exercises that strengthened his physical stamina to pain. 67
An insensible and seemingly invincible Cruz egged on the violent mob, shouting “Hit
me, I am still standing! Hit me, I am not a liar,” in direct defiance to the accusations and
brutal, unimaginable violence he and his friends received. 68 His provocations
temporarily diverted the mob’s attention from thoughts of igniting the gas soaked Rojano
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and González. The mob turned to Cruz and beat him mercilessly for his taunts. An older
woman accused Cruz of being el diablo; apparently under the impression no human could
possibly endure the extreme physical punishment unleashed on his body. 69 Cruz
eventually arrived at the grizzly scene of Odilón Sanchez, who died from a shotgun
wound to the head. 70 As his body lay under the church spires, Cruz witnessed a ten year
old child beating his dead corpse with a stick. The explosion of social violence involved
a diverse sector of Canoa’s population, indicating that the town’s social anxieties affected
entire families, including children. The communal violence unleashed lingering pent up
social, economic, and political frustrations on an individual level that affected each
person in different ways.
Cruz’s relentless beating continued as he suffered blows to his head from
hammers and rocks and other makeshift weapons. Rojano and González remained
leashed by ropes and tied together, but could no longer maintain the sordid exercise.
González overheard a man saying he was going to slice him with a machete. As the
blade fell down he instinctively blocked the blade with his hand and severed three of his
fingers before the blade sunk into his forehead. He somehow survived the encounter. 71
Rojano remained at the mercy of the crowd that dragged him and Cruz to Canoa’s zócalo.
The enraged mob formed a human wall around the UAP employees, cornering them from
escape. The shouts and threats of murder continued between demands to see there cache
of propaganda.
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At last, the police arrived on scene dispersed the angry mob from inciting more
destruction. The arrival of the police did not deter some individuals from threatening to
attack the initial police force as well. According to Miguel Flores Cruz, the immediate
tension forced the police to withdraw from defending the UAP employees, at least
temporary, for fear the violent mob would turn their outrage on them. 72 The communal
anxieties that exploded into collective violence formed an attack against the image of
Canoa’s socioeconomic and political problems. To some of Canoa’s residents, the police
were no different from the bandits, and only represented another layer of political
corruption. According to Flores Cruz, “there would have been a slaughter” had the
crowd decided to press forth with its homicidal inclinations against the police. 73
The individual who alerted Puebla’s civil authority’s to the communal uprising in
Canoa leads to another separate, yet equally important incident that elucidates the power
of public memory, and points to the existence of competing narratives to the Canoa
lynching. On that night, Canoa’s mayor, Martín Pérez Arce, visited Pascual Romero
Pérez’s store and placed the phone call that alerted the Radio Patrol Corps, the Red
Cross, and the police headquarters in Puebla to the ongoing communal violence. 74 It
remains unclear precisely what happened during this incident, but at some point during
the encounter, Romero Pérez received a gunshot wound in the stomach. After the call for
an ambulance was placed, a group of inhabitants created an impromptu barricade of rocks
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in the street that prevented civil authorities from entering Canoa. 75 It is beyond
coincidental that Romero Pérez, who owned the only telephone that could access the
outside world, received a gunshot wound and could not identify his assailant. 76
Within the chaotic center of the lynch mob, Julian González remembered hearing
members of the crowd discussing Pascual Romero’s gunshot wound, demonstrating the
mob’s apparent connection between the lynching and the shooting of the storekeeper.
According to González, one resident speculated Romero took pity on the UAP employees
and placed the phone call to Puebla for an ambulance. This implies Romero might have
received his gunshot wound in direct response for his attempts at stopping the lynchings.
It is possible certain perpetrators including Arce visited Romero’s store as part of a
conscious effort to prevent anyone from alerting the civil authorities in Puebla.
González also remembered other inhabitants speculating Romero had accidentally shot
himself and someone called the ambulance on his behalf. This scenario seems less
probable, and does not explain the improvised roadblock that appeared to be in direct
response to the emergency phone call. If the first ambulance arrived without a police
escort, one can speculate the first call received to Puebla did not contain information
pertaining to the swelling homicidal mob, otherwise the ambulance would unlikely enter
town in disorder without appropriate protection.
El Sol de Puebla later speculated Pascual Romero received his gunshot wound
when certain residents from Canoa arrived at his home, possibly including Arce, and
demanded to use his telephone, but the store owner refused to do so. 77 Initial DFS
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government reports mentioned Romero Pérez’s mysterious gunshot, but reported the
victim was unsure where the shot came from. 78 This leads one to speculate the store
owner may have personally known the shooter but did not want to cooperate with the
initial police investigation. Romero Pérez recovered from his injuries in the same Civil
Hospital of Puebla as the UAP employees. Only later, when the Judicial Police of Puebla
named Martín Pérez Arce as the principle instigators of the lynching did Pascual Romero
Pérez admit the former had visited his house to place the phone call.
Histories of the Canoa lynching often overlook this seemingly insignificant
moment, but the conflicting interpretations raises important questions about the generally
accepted narrative. The general paucity of information about the mysterious gunshot
confirms the presence of a competing historical narrative separate from the generally
accepted version. It reveals the boundaries of historical thought between what actually
happened and what is thought to have happened. 79 The mysterious gunshot wound points
to yet another instance where the production of public memory is twisted depending on
the angle of historical interpretation. Accounts of the lynching that center solely on the
testimony from the UAP employees tend to reinforce the dominant narrative that the only
true victims of Canoa were outsiders. This dependency on the dominant public memory
inadvertently marginalizes Canoa’s resident victims, who remain in the shadows within
the Canoa lynching’s public memory.
The lynching in Canoa lasted approximately two and a half hours from the
moment the church bells rang, and resulted in the deaths of Lucas García, Odilón
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Sanchez, Jesús Carrillo, and Ramón Gutiérrez. The victims received multiple contusions,
hemorrhages, lesions, and puncture wounds created by the makeshift weapons carried by
the mob. The survivors, Roberto Rojano, Julián González, and Miguel Flores Cruz,
received medical attention to their grave injuries at Sanatorio Particular Guadalupe, a
private hospital in Puebla. 80 On the night of machetes, Canoa remained in a state of
disorder until 12:40 am as police investigators probed what sparked the violent
outburst. 81
This is the point where the generally accepted version of events ends, effectively
painting the lynching as an isolated act of violence committed by people separated from
the outside world. However, the lynching’s aftermath reveals many crucial details in the
historiography concerning the movimiento estudiantil in Puebla, and the diverging
reactions to the lynching received in various parts of Mexico. The next chapter will
examine the lynching’s immediate aftermath and its relation to larger issues of
community, power, and memory in Mexico.
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CHAPTER 2: THE AFTERMATH
On the morning of September 15th, 1968, El Sol de Puebla ran a front page article
that described the Canoa lynchings as a defensive response to the malicious actions
committed by the UAP employees. The article was titled “They tried to raise a Red and
Black Flag and this was the Consequence,” painted the UAP employees as communist
agitators. The unsigned article interviewed the only conscious victim available for
comment in the hospital, Miguel Flores Cruz, who stated the UAP employees had been
confused for students. However, as the title of the article indicates, the newspaper editors
insinuated the UAP employees had received just punishment for their actions. The
newspaper interviewed police authorities who claimed Canoa’s residents stated the UAP
employees had arrived in town and wanted to loot a store where they drank refreshments,
inferring to the store owned by Don Pascual Romero. According to the article, the men
wanted to place a red and black flag in the church tower and for these reasons were
attacked by the angry mob. 1
Few national newspapers outside Puebla reported the Canoa lynchings in detail.
Only local news agencies in Puebla closely followed the incident’s aftermath and the
subsequent police investigations. Confusion and factual inaccuracies are apparent in
some national press reports. One Excélsior article published on September 15th
inaccurately reported four of the UAP employees died in the attack. In an apparent
contradiction, the article indicated the physical destruction of the bodies made
identification impossible, yet the article listed the names of the dead, including survivors
Roberto Rojano and Julián González. Odilón Sánchez and Lucas García did not appear
1
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in the list of victims. Furthermore, the article reported the men tried to place a red and
black flag on Canoa’s church. 2 This unsubstantiated claim linked the UAP employees
with the student movement and simultaneously conditioned the reader to believe the
communal violence directed against the employees had some justification. The article
subtly reinforced the stereotypes of people del pueblo as violent and reactionary
individuals who in this case acted to defend the sanctity of their church. Furthermore, the
article alluded to the incident with the red and black in Mexico City’s Zócalo, suggesting
the UAP employees were in fact communist agitators disturbing the social order of
Canoa.
The news concerning the murdered UAP employees created a tense reaction in
Puebla, especially on the UAP campus. A government report indicated a group of
students called Santillanistas, a violent PRI-sponsored anti student movement group,
attempted to “capitalize” on the UAP employee’s deaths to draw support for their own
movement. The reports do not indicate in what capacity the Santillanistas exploited the
lynching; however their actions forced the suspension of a special ceremony for the
victims held in the assembly hall at the UAP campus. The relatives of the deceased UAP
employees asked university authorities to suspend the ceremony in order to avoid any
potential conflict among student groups. 3 The Santillanistas’ actions received
widespread opposition and condemnation by university authorities and the bereaved
relatives. 4
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The Santillanistas gained notoriety in Mexico from Ernesto Santillana Santillana,
the former police chief of Tijuana and officer from the Mexican Attorney General’s
Office. In the 1960s, the UAP rector, José Garibay Ávalos supported the Santillanistas
as a measure to counter the student movement’s widespread popularity, and to destabilize
the extensive democratic actions across campus. The Santillanistas were also involved
with many infamous murders and disappearances of UAP student protestors in the
1960s. 5 These virulent attacks drew tacit support from the Díaz Ordaz administration,
who viewed the ongoing student movement as the largest threat to the stability of
Mexico.
Only a few preliminary DFS reports mentioned the Santillanistas before
government agents completely reversed the story and blamed the student movement.
Subsequent DFS reports stated the movimiento estudiantil tried to capitalize on the deaths
of the UAP employees during the ceremony held at the UAP campus. 6 The significant
alteration in the official story points to the underlying prerogative of DFS security forces
in 1968 Mexico. DFS agents undoubtedly focused their largest attention and concerns on
the widespread student movement, viewed as a serious threat to the stability of Mexico.
This alteration in the government records elucidates the monumental efforts by DFS
security personnel to inflate the threat posed by the student movement in Puebla.
Eliminating the Santillanistas from official reports protected state power and prevented
any blowback caused by the failed attempt of a government-backed organization to
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capitalize on the deaths of UAP employees in Canoa. By blaming the ongoing student
movement, the government security force reinforced the central position held by the Díaz
Ordaz administration treating the student movement as the central threat to state power.
During the morning of September 16, 1968, on Mexico’s Independence Day,
approximately 100 family members, friends, and students from the UAP processed in a
funeral ceremony and protest for Jesús Carillo and Ramon Gutiérrez. The funeral protest
marked the first public engagement staged to draw attention to the grave injustice caused
in Puebla’s countryside. The group departed the UAP assembly hall and filed into
Puebla’s streets, eventually nearing the center zócalo. Members from the funeral
procession carried posters and a blackboard improvised into a massive banner that read,
“Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, justice here for the employees, killed by the
fanaticism and the patriotism of satrap García Valseca, and PRI.” 7 The message
publically blamed the political corruption from the PRI and the state-controlled
newspapers like El Sol de Puebla for creating a culture of fear that demonized the UAP
and student protestors in general.
The funeral procession coincided with an annual military parade that celebrated
Mexican Independence. The parade included Puebla’s state governor Merino Aaron
Hernandez, the head of Puebla’s military zone General Eusebio Gonzalez Saldaña and
other state officials. El Sol de Puebla reported the military needed to divert its intended
parade route along September 16th Street to avoid the approaching funeral procession. 8
The grieving relatives and UAP employees undoubtedly planned their unsanctioned
7
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procession to coincide with the planned funeral parade in order to draw public attention
to the lynchings. Multiple government reports indicated both marches proceeded without
incident. 9 It is doubtful the military envoy which included many senior political and
military personnel would attempt to disrupt the grieving funeral protestors, especially on
a state-sanctioned holiday. The diverging military parade became an important scene in
the film rendition Canoa which portrayed the event as an example of the state and army’s
benevolent intentions. 10
A significant antecedent to the Canoa incident undoubtedly involved El Sol de
Puebla, the main news daily of Puebla owned and operated by Jose García Valseca, the
newspaper magnate. García Valseca shared overwhelming and unwavering support for
the Díaz Ordaz administration, and his newspaper reflected the national Cold War
policies of the Mexican government. El Sol de Puebla helped facilitate the spread of
social anxiety directed towards student protestors from the UAP. Researcher Guillermina
Meaney provided a list of newspaper excerpts relating to El Sol de Puebla in her first
chapter of Canoa: El Crimen impune. 11 These excerpts sample the newspaper’s progovernment and negative portrayal of student protestors dating back several months
before the Canoa lynching. El Sol de Puebla and many other Valseca owned newspapers
tried to mold public opinion against the student protestors. For example, following the
red and black flag incident in the Mexico City Zócalo, El Sol de Puebla and 32 other
journals in the news conglomerate La Organización Periodística García Valseca, placed a
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front-page “site in honor” commemorating the Mexican flag. 12 The newspaper explained
that Mexicans and poblanos shared a mutual obligation to make amends to the national
flag desecrated just days prior.
Within Puebla in 1968, El Sol de Puebla functioned as an important mouthpiece
for distributing Mexican government propaganda, providing an interwoven mixture of
apologetic praise for the Díaz Ordaz administration, and daily reminders to the threat
posed by international communism and the student movement. Díaz Ordaz viewed the
widespread student protests as a direct threat to the overall stability of Mexican state
power. In his Annual Informe, the president urged Mexicans to “focus on reconquering
the peace.” His rhetoric painted the protesting student’s as social agitators disrupting
Mexican society. It was a vital necessity to restore harmony and social order before the
Olympics officially commenced on October 12th, 1968. 13 Ordaz viewed the student
movement as an embarrassment, and wanted to halt the protests before the world
spotlight reached Mexico City. El Sol de Puebla reported a favorable opinion of Díaz
Ordaz’s policies which vociferously denounced communism. For example, a week prior
to the lynching, the news daily printed an editorial described the threat of “Imperialist
Communists” from the Soviet Union, supported by a “class of human robots”
programmed to blindly obey the communist party line. 14 Media reports played an
intricate role in spreading anti-communist sentiment throughout Puebla, including the
rural peripheries. The distribution of anti-communist and anti-student movement
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sentiment filtered into Canoa through local regional newspapers like El Sol De Puebla
and deeply affected the opinions of Canoa’s residents, including Enrique Meza.
On 17 September, at 1:30pm, Enrique Meza Pérez presented himself at the
Military Zone headquarters in Puebla. 15 Meza ventured to the capital in direct response
to a front page article published the same morning in El Sol de Puebla, alleging the
priest’s implicit involvement in the lynching. The allegations derived from statements
made from Roberto Rojano who labeled the priest as the lynching “mastermind.” 16 A
government report indicated Meza requested an immediate meeting with Col. Arturo
Venegas, the chief of staff at the headquarters. During this extraordinary gathering
between a rural village priest and city military colonel, Meza requested Venegas send a
platoon of soldiers to San Miguel Canoa in order to protect the town’s inhabitants from
reprisal attacks by the “students.” 17 At the military zone, Meza described his own version
of events. He stated that on that night he did not realize what had happened because when
he went to the parish he felt ill, and due to hearing loss, (y que como esta falto del oido)
he decided to rest in the rooms.” 18 He stated that at 9:30pm he heard women shouting
“Matenlos, matenlos,” (kill them, kill them) but he did not understand their motivations.
He firmly denied the accusations brought forth in the press by Rojano, and appeared
surprised one of the wounded signaled him out as the lynching mastermind.
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According to a DFS document written about Meza’s visit to the military
headquarters, the priest proclaimed the surviving victims should be “grateful” (agredecer)
for his personal intervention that stopped the lynching. Meza told Col. Venegas that
despite the tremendous scandal in the streets and his illness, he overcame these obstacles,
left the sanctity of the church and proceeded to intervene and calm the villagers down.
Meza believed that if not for his involvement, Rojano and the others would have been
killed. 19 Meza’s personal statements confirmed he was aware of the lynching and present
in the streets when it occurred. Col. Venegas could only listen to Meza’s version of
events, and explained to the priest he did not have the authority to exercise the army
without approval from his superiors. Venegas suggested Meza submit an official letter in
writing requesting military protection for Canoa. No indications suggest Meza followed
through with the colonel’s suggestion.
The government report indicated Meza’s version of events contained “endless
contradictions” signifying that military official’s believed Meza fabricated his story to
make sense of his experience. For example, Meza surmised someone had gained
unauthorized access to the church’s bell tower to ring the bells by climbing a set of
scaffolding along the church’s exterior. Meza undoubtedly heard the wild ringing, the
blaring megaphone, and the thunderous chorus of enraged inhabitants. Yet his own
statements confirm Meza waited to exit the church much later, possibly hours after the
lynchings began. Meza told Col. Venegas he suffered from hearing loss, but could
distinctly hear women encouraging the crowd to “kill them” off in the distance.
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Subsequent interviews with Meza do not mention the meeting with Puebla’s military
zone, suggesting Meza eliminated this embarrassing detail from his version of events.
This rather bizarre and previously undocumented meeting raises several questions
about Meza’s behavior and political motivations to present himself at the feet of military
power. 20 Meza probably felt politically vulnerable and defenseless against a reprisal
attack for the crimes committed in his village. His actions offer a lens to view his
psychological landscape, revealing a genuine fear for the student movement. It
underscores how susceptible Meza appeared to threats of insurrection. Meza feared
Canoa’s social order was threatened, and acted in a manner that reveals his erratic
determination to preserve the stability of Canoa. Perhaps Meza requested the military in
order to avoid Puebla’s police, fearing he might implicate himself within the ongoing
criminal investigation. Nevertheless, Meza’s fretful imagination saw the University
protestors from Puebla or Mexico City retaliating for the lynchings. This fear
demonstrates Meza was not exempt from the regional or national fears of communist
insurrection. He also understood communism’s connection and association with the
student protestors. It is clear Meza felt personally threatened by Rojano’s accusation in
the media and visited the military to ensure his own power was protected.
But were Meza’s fears of a violent retaliation from the student movement
unfounded? After the events, Canoa’s residents remained in a state of restlessness and
fear for several months, spurred by the mixture of religious fanaticism and the
proliferation of fretful rumors and anxiety that the student’s would return to seek revenge.
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According to a former Canoa resident, rumors abounded the “students are coming.” 21
The climate of fear and social anxiety draped over Canoa did not dissipate immediately
after the lynching’s occurred. Most likely, Meza’s meeting at the military headquarters
reflected the general insecurity and vulnerably felt within Canoa’s community.
In a 2008 interview that marked the 40th anniversary of the Canoa lynching,
Miguel Flores Cruz indicated after “the accident,” certain people wanted to inflict a
violent retaliatory attack on Canoa’s villagers. Immediately after the lynching, the
survivors contacted non-academic employees and students from the UAP who “wanted to
go and burn the houses of this pueblo.” As the group organized and readied to leave, the
army intervened and prevented them from committing any acts of vengeance against the
town! 22 Eventually, their anger subsided due in large part to the collective efforts on the
behalf of non-violent student protestors and members from the UAP University Council
who acted in a constructive manner to assuage the mounting pressures surrounding the
UAP campus and in Puebla.
In the immediate aftermath of the Canoa lynching, an intense public outcry
emanated primarily from the UAP campus demanding the state government deliver
justice for the lynched UAP employees. Led by the UAP University Council comprised
from administrators, faculty, employees, and students, the organization responded to the
immediate financial needs of the victims and the bereaved relatives. The University

21

Interview with Pánfilo Zepeda in Carlos E. Sevillas S., Novedades de Puebla, 4; Zepeda stated, “Soy
inocente, jura…”
22
Interview with Miguel Flores Cruz in Labarreda González, Jorge, “Entrevista Canoa,” in El 68 en
Puebla: Memoria y encuentros, edited by Enrique Agüera Ibáñez, (Puebla: Benemérita Universidad
Autónoma de Puebla, 2008), 176; Cruz does not elaborate any further on this detail. This appears to be the
first interview to indicate UAP employees had planned a violent retaliation against Canoa. Further research
should address this crucial portion of the lynching’s aftermath.

57
Council demanded Puebla’s state government conduct a thorough investigation to bring
the lynching perpetrators to justice. They also condemned the state-controlled
newspapers, like El Sol de Puebla, for inculcating a negative public perception of
university students, the UAP, and the large scale student movement. Analyzing the
immediate public reaction from the UAP campus and within newspapers offers a lens to
view Puebla’s public reaction to the Canoa lynching as it buttressed against official state
policy. The few national newspapers that reported the Canoa lynching or its aftermath
framed the narrative to blame the student movement for causing the deaths of the UAP
employees.
On the UAP campus, the Consejo Nacional de Huelga (CNH), or National Strike
Council which represented the nationwide collective of student protestors in Mexico,
continued their coordinated democratic action across the UAP campuses and attempted to
link with the UAP employees. On the afternoon of September 17th, 1968, six student
representatives from the CNH presented themselves at the Carolino building and
approached workers from the House of Studies, offering their unconditional support for
the employees lynched in San Miguel Canoa. 23 A contingent of employees from the
UAP called a meeting to decide the appropriate response to the tragedy, and whether to
accept help from the CNH. Approximately 240 UAP employees assembled in the
Carolino building, presided by Alberto Gutierrez Ramos, the University Director of
Employees, and Board Secretary Maria Estela Rebollar.
The assembly gathered for over two hours and agreed to a series of symbolic
measures designed to protect the wellbeing of the UAP employees and demand justice for
23
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what occurred to them. They first decided to send President Díaz Ordaz a letter
information him the details of what happened in Canoa, and requesting immediate justice
for the victims. The assembly arranged to make necessary financial contributions for any
future legal action. The UAP employees who called the assembly understood the
enormous political tension surrounding the UAP, the student protestors, and the Mexican
state. These social tensions most likely influenced the assembly’s unanimous decision to
remain politically neutral and distant from the CNH to avoid receiving any negative
reactions by federal, state, or local populations. Therefore, they decided to announce
publically that they would not accept any intervention from the student movements from
either Puebla or Mexico City. The assembly decided the lynchings of the UAP employee
resulted from consequences completely unrelated to the protests movement. 24
The Assembly’s public stance of neutrality from the National Strike Council
appears as a calculated political decision to avoid an escalation in the mounting social
tensions in Puebla and larger Mexico. It sheds light on the tense political climate within
Puebla and the local anxieties people shared about their association with the Mexican
Student Movement. Neutrality from the CNH assured the UAP employee assembly to
alleviate the mounting social pressures that produced a backlash of violence directed
towards University affiliated employees. Though the assembly ultimately decided to
distant themselves from the CNH contacts in Puebla and Mexico City, the CNH student
representatives sent to the Carolino building had recognized the obvious connection
between the widespread student protests and the communal violence that erupted in
Canoa. The CNH viewed the Canoa lynching as an opportunity to link into the broader
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UAP employee community and to expand public support for their massive democratic
initiative.
Later in the evening on September 17th, the University Council held an
extraordinary midnight session in the UAP auditorium. Approximately 140 people
attended the meeting, including Jose Sanchez de Lliana, the UAP Secretary General, who
acted as Rector of the University and chaired the meeting. Ismael Acevedo Andrade, The
Secretary and Director of the School Department also attended, along with thirty
counselors, university employees and ninety students. The group collectively examined
the events that occurred in Canoa. The meeting implemented a plan to fray the funeral
costs for the bereaved relatives and to help the UAP employees injured in the attack.
Using a tape recorder, the University Council heard the moving statements of Julián
Gonzalez who recounted the bloody episode. After analyzing the events, the University
Council agreed to the following decisions.
First, they solicited the cooperation of all teachers who served at the University to
donate a day’s salary and asked the University Directors to donate ten days of their
wages. A $5 fee increase would be assessed per student enrolled at the university to help
the bereaved. The state governor, Merino Aaron Hernandez would be asked to provide
economic assistance for the injured UAP employees and also the victim’s relatives. The
University Council also wanted to workers compensation for the injured employees for
physical disabilities in accordance with the Federal Labor Law. They also wanted a
guarantee the men would not lose their jobs. Two lawyers from the UAP Law
Department, Gilberto Gomez Castellanos y Jose Sanchez de Illian would provide council
for the men in case of possible legal action. The University Council also wrote a public
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declaration directed at the national press for which they demanded freedom of belief and
expression, and a demand for objectivity and an end to their blatantly biased nature of
their reporting. Furthermore, the University Council demanded justice for the murdered
employees and for the criminal mastermind of the lynching to be apprehended and
prosecuted. 25
The special midnight session by the University Council also agreed to ask the state to
demand financial compensation from the clergy (exigir al clero una indemnización) after
all financial resources are exhausted. 26 This profound decision indicates the University
Council also alleged Enrique Meza to be the principal architect behind the Canoa
lynching, and directed state investigations to hold him accountable for the crimes
committed under his guidance.
The University Council’s decision to condemn the state-controlled newspapers
confirmed the presence of a widely held belief across the UAP campus that viewed the
news agencies as culpable for spreading the seeds of hatred towards students and the
University. The Council’s response echoed the public protests from UAP employees,
students, and grieving families in the funeral marchers a few days prior, which blamed
García Valseca’s news conglomerate for contributing to the lynching. Government
documents labeled the University Council’s assembly “extraordinary” for its total effort
by the part of UAP administrators, employees and students to assist the victims of Canoa
and seek legal justice for those that contributed to the events. The joint effort eventually
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raised an estimated 40,000 pesos for the UAP victims and their families. 27 The University
Council’s assembly symbolically represented the opinions widely held across the
university and sent a powerful message to the press to stop its biased representations and
characterizations of the UAP and its student body.
The next day, El Sol de Puebla responded to the University Council’s midnight
assembly and their “Official Declaration” to the public. The article obfuscated the
content within the major decisions from the University Council, and did not report in
detail about the university-wide financial plan to help the victims. Not surprisingly, El
Sol de Puebla did not report the sixth article, the universal condemnation of the statecontrolled newspaper. In fact, the El Sol de Puebla article belittled the Council’s
assembly and claimed their declarations were “ignored when first published,” even
though the meeting occurred that very morning at the midnight hour. 28
The article appeared on page six, buried under the major national news story from
that day, the army occupation of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the
UNAM on September 19,, 1968. During that incident, the government broke the
constitutional guarantee of university autonomy and raided University City with tanks,
armored personnel carriers, and an estimated ten thousand soldiers. The Secretary of
Interior, Luis Echeverría, authorized the army invasion with the implicit intent to
undermine the Mexico City student movement. The government viewed the UNAM as a
hub of subversive activity and launched its occupation to posture a disproportional use of
force as a warning to student activists to terminate their mass actions directed against the
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state. 29 El Sol de Puebla reported that the army recovered various Molotov cocktails
stored by students in the Science buildings which were upholstered in anti-government
slogans and “Che” Guevara effigies. 30 The information described the subversive and
potentially dangerous nature of student groups, and their apparent influences derived
from international communism.
Two significant editorials published weeks after the Canoa lynching elucidate the
efforts to frame the narrative of the lynching away from Canoa’s local problems and its
mounting sociopolitical tensions and into the national fold. The national newspapers
controlled and significantly altered the narrative by linking the incident with the threats
posed by the student movement in Mexico City. These articles completely minimalized
the local conditions in Canoa because the writers own interpretations came from the
metropole, where the political crisis between the Mexican state and the student
movement loomed large. The editorial pieces corresponded dialogically between Ramón
Ertze Garamendi, a Spanish priest from the Santa Iglesia Cathedral, and Rene Capistran
Garza, former member from the National Defense League for Religious Liberty (Liga
Nacional Defensora de la Libertad Religiosa). Garza contributed regularly in opinion
columns in national newspapers, and delivered virulently anti-communist and progovernment sentiment that condemned the student movement as a subversive plan against
Mexico, and an outright religious attack against Christianity. 31 The two religious
representatives framed the public perception of the Canoa lynching in a way that
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significantly altered what happened and reinforced the government stance that
condemned the student movement as Mexico’s social antagonists.
On September 19th, 1968, Excélsior published Ertze Garamendi’s op-ed “Student
Dignity,” described “the psychological repression that erupted across the country against
some students, presenting them as communists, defilers of the most sacred and
respectable, this bearing the fruit of bitterness as they are attacked in their own schools
and the lynching of four people, with wounding four other people in the village of San
Miguel Canoa, in Puebla.” Garamendi condemned those primarily responsible for the
violence; the press, and to a larger extent the Díaz Ordaz administration, for “throwing
lies” and taking advantage of the students. 32 The author reminded the Mexican
government to abide to its primary tasks of order and peace before pointing out the
general ineffectiveness of the student movement, with its limited ability to disrupt the
country and bring attention to its goals. According to Ertze Garamendi, the student’s
decision to prolong their strike was “not beneficial to anyone,” casting blame for the
widespread “psychological repression” on the students and the lynchings in Canoa. Ertze
Garamendi’s editorial recognized the news agency and the state’s responsibility for the
eruption of “psychological repression” directed against the students, but blamed the
social movement for prolonging the political instability in Mexico. This moderate view
eliminated the student movement’s voice and their political legitimacy. Although the
article criticized certain unnamed actors for spreading hatred towards the students and for
causing the lynchings in Canoa, Ertze Garamendi did not specify. In a sense, the op-ed
affirmed the government line, asking the students to stop their demonstrations causing the
32
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Mexican state to use its psychological repression which caused violence and the
lynchings to occur in Canoa.
Rene Capistran Garza responded directly to Ertze Garamendi a week later in an El
Sol de Puebla column on September 25, 1968. The editorial scolded the priest for
exceeding “all imaginable recklessness” and for promoting the subversive ideas held by
the student movement. Garza imagined a deeply divided Mexico split between two
religious and political camps, between non-communists and communists and nonCatholics and Catholics. He envisioned other loyal Catholics doing their part to “prevent
Mexico from sinking into chaos,” which is exactly what the residents of San Miguel de
Canoa did when they lynched the “four young unhappy agitators.” Garza inaccurately
reported four dead “agitators,” demonstrating the general misperceptions about lack of
general knowledge about what happened in Canoa. Garza likely obtained his information
from the misleading Excélsior article printed September 15th that reported four UAP
employees died after attempting to raise a red and black flag. Garza’s comments shed
light on the development of competing social narratives that tried to make sense of the
communal violence and significantly altered the realities of the situation.
Garza neither applauded nor condoned the acts of violence against the lynched
UAP men, and instead viewed Canoa’s residents responding and defending against an
attack to their town and religious institution caused by the subversive element of
communism. His words mirrored the official government version of events that found
the student movement culpable for the events that transpired in Canoa. Garza labeled the
lynching as an act of terror, and “a sobering warning” of things to come in Mexico.
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Incidentally, this prophetic announcement occurred just a week prior to the government
sponsored massacre at Tlatelolco, on October 2, 1968. 33
The Canoa lynchings generally accepted narrative was developed primarily by
social actors and institutions from within the metropole of Mexico City and Puebla. The
narrative tended to downplay and exclude Canoa’s internal political and social strife. The
lynchings were decentered and divorced from Canoa and the rural countryside. The
creation of the dominant narrative focused almost entirely on the lynchings as according
to the UAP employees, undoubtedly the lynch mob’s primary targets. The UAP
employees provide some of the detailed coverage available. Subsequent state
investigations were continually hampered by uncooperative residents unwilling to
recount the events. However, the centralization on the UAP employees often ignores the
local political and socioeconomic situation within Canoa, and the larger contextualization
of Mexico’s experience of the cold war.
Efforts by the UAP University Council and many others to bring public attention
to the Canoa lynching helped frame the incident in a way that marginalized many other
existing competing narratives. For example, a crucial gap exists between the experiences
of Odilón Sánchez and Lucas García, both killed by the lynch mob. In general accounts,
these victims are listed among the dead but their individual stories remain obscured by
the prominence of the UAP employees. The heavy focus on the UAP men overshadows
these and other accounts which may reveal pertinent details. For example, a historical
analysis of Lucas García and his involvement with the CCI might reveal a richer

33

Rene Capistran Garza, “Réplica a Ertze Garamendi,” El Sol de Puebla, Sept. 25, 1968; Elaine Carey
titled her segment on the lynchings “the Harbinger of things to Come.”

66
contextualization of Canoa’s internal political tensions between Padre Meza.
Furthermore, there is a noticeable silence in the historiography concerning Canoa’s
experiences with the lynching and its aftermath. 34
The internal social tensions in Canoa did not dissipate after the outbreak of
communal violence on September 14, 1968. Those who participated in the lynching
demonstrated their pent up frustrations on the supposed communist infiltrators.
However, the underlying social, economic, and political tensions persisted even after the
violence subsided as the bodies were cleared from the streets. In the immediate aftermath
of the lynching, many residents openly questioned the authority of Padre Meza.
According to one government security document, on September 21, 1968, Canoa’s
general population, along with ecclesiastical authorities and the Frente Popular de
Padres de Estudiantes de Enseñanza Superior (Popular Front of Parents of Students for
Higher Education) accused Meza of violating individual guarantees according to
municipal authorities and the police. The group accused church authorities for “failing to
prevent unprotected immorality” to their religion, in stark contradiction with the Mexican
constitution. According to them, Meza also unfairly charged Canoa’s inhabitants for
various religious services that the group wanted to bring to the attention of the
Archbishop. The people also accused government lackeys and the corrupt and
“mercenary” García Velseca-owned newspapers “poisoned the city,” and were
responsible for the lynching deaths of four individuals. 35
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This crucial piece of evidence confirms many of Canoa’s residents were deeply
connected to the outside world, especially through newspapers like El Sol de Puebla.
They also recognized the biased nature of the pro-government newspapers, who they
blamed for the culture of fear draped over Canoa. The residents were not ignorant of the
national political environment or the global cold war. On the contrary, their combined
efforts to inform government authorities about García Velseca and Padre Meza mirrored
the sentiment shared by UAP survivors, the UAP University Council, and other
outspoken critics from Puebla.
After the death of Lucas García, some neighbors collected 30,000 pesos to donate
to Tomasa García, widowed after the attack that killed her husband and left her four
children fatherless. However, the family never received the communal donation because
Enrique Meza took the money before leaving Canoa in 1969. 36 Despite witnessing the
horrific violence against her husband by neighbors and other residents, Tomasa García
and her family stayed in town, explaining to journalists in 1976, “[Canoa] is our pueblo,
where are we going to go, we have made a life here. My son Pascual scrapes magueys,
gets twenty pesos a day, and with this we live with his five brothers and I.” 37 As a
widow of a poor farmer in Mexico’s countryside, Tomasa García never received justice
or financial assistance for her husband’s murder.
A sustained and multifaceted effort from inside and outside Canoa eventually
forced Enrique Meza to leave his position in 1969. Ecclesiastical authorities led by an
archbishop recalled Padre Meza and sent him to San Inés Ahuatempan, a small town
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located near the border of Puebla and Oaxaca. 38 San Inés Ahuatempan just happened to
be the place of birth for Puebla’s state governor Aarón Merino Fernández, a close friend
of Meza. 39 In an interview with Impacto, Meza candidly recalled his version of events,
demonstrating his total lack of remorse for what happened. Further, Meza explained how
his established political connections kept him from being investigated or prosecuted.
Meza insisted “everything that happened that night in 1968, they [the UAP employees]
asked for it. They were from Puebla and they knew where they were going.” Of course,
Meza’s version grossly oversimplified what actually happened. According to Meza, the
UAP men were the ones who incited the lynching after they shot the storekeeper, Pascual
Romero Pérez. According to Meza, after one of the UAP men shot Pascual Romero in
the stomach, they ran to Lucas García’s house. 40 Meza firmly denied the allegation he
incited the mob. In one interview, he offered as evidence his sacrosanctity in claiming, “I
am a priest and I cannot lie.” 41
Padre Meza benefited from having high-level political connections, with Puebla’s
Attorney General, who was also his personal friend. Meza stated to the Impacto
journalists, “I have always been good with the government. Well, [Puebla’s] governor
was Aarón Merino Fernández, also a friend of mine. Do you think that if I was culpable,
I would be free? I have never been involved in politics. Now the [new] priest of Canoa is
a nephew of mine. The other day I went and spoke into the microphone and in fifteen
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minutes the entire town was in the church. The people said, ‘Why would we not want
Padre Meza?’ 42
Meza’s telling recollections are notable for his conscious effort to avoid his own
intricate involvement, Canoa’s system of political corruption, the mounting rural
frustrations, the culture of fear, the layers of political anxiety, and the existence of
internal tensions between him and the CCI. Meza probably believed the young UAP men
were communist agitators threatening the town’s social order. His interview confirmed
that Meza convinced himself that the violence unleashed against the UAP men was
justified, and that they deserved it. Meza’s oversimplified memory projected his own
ignoble stance about the sanctity of life and the protection of religious freedom. His
interview testified to his general lack of knowledge about what actually transpired.
Canoa resident Añade Cepeda confirmed the existence of another competing
narrative that blamed the UAP men for what occurred. Her versions of events reveal a
religious justification offered as a defense for the violence. She explained some others
told her later “the guys from the university were at fault for everything.” According to
Cepeda, after the men snacked at don Pascual’s store, “they confessed they were
communists, and at that hour many townspeople were drinking, watching, and listening.
Then when don Pascual charged their check, the boys shot at him.” Cepeda’s alternative
version contended the other customers in the store then followed the men to Lucas
García’s house where they had planned to sleep for the night. Cepeda then provided a
telling piece of evidence that this alternative version originated from a religious authority,
stating, “These men said they were universitarios, and the first thing they teach when
42
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they have entered the university is that there is no God. And I ask you, who made the
world? Who makes it move?” 43
Who perpetuated the stereotype in Canoa that all university students were
instructed and inculcated with atheistic beliefs? Who divided Canoa between the
religious binary of good and evil? Canoa’s local narrative tried to make sense of what
happened by blaming the UAP outsiders, a conveniently oversimplified account that
ignored larger historical contextualization. The local narrative that echoed Meza’s
version is not a lie and should be taken seriously if only to reveal the existence of
competing narratives which offer insight into the production of public memory at the
local level. These conflicting memories remembered certain details but forgot other
factors. For instance, Meza’s version ignored the death of Lucas García, the CCI, or any
other conditions that fueled the lynching. This version gave the illusion everything in
Canoa was fine until the UAP men disrupted the social order.
During the subsequent investigation into the Canoa lynching, investigators likely
received enormous political pressure from social activists who represented the UAP
employees, including the University Council. These efforts forced the state to bring to
justice the alleged criminal masterminds who incited the lynching. Few, if any residents
were willing to speak with investigators even though the residents likely knew who the
main culprits were. A general lack of cooperation hindered police efforts to collect data.
Perhaps this lack of on-the-ground information contributed to the overall failure by police
to prosecute the guilty party, and to wrongfully convict two indigenous men who barely
spoke the Spanish language.
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Ultimately, the police issued 18 arrest warrants of which five people were
charged, and two people, Pablo Sánchez and Pánfilo Zepeda García, served prison
sentences of eight and eleven years, respectively. Many of the suspects arrested by police
were Indians who barely spoke Spanish, raising several doubts about the criminal
proceedings. 44 Pablo Sánchez, arrested on May 5, 1969, was charged with inciting the
mob that caused the lynching. 45 El Sol de Puebla reported that Sánchez “spoke with
great difficulty in Spanish.” It turned out Sánchez was convicted and incarcerated for
crimes he did not commit. Mistaken for man who shared the exact same name, Pablo
Sánchez’s wrongful conviction demonstrated the farcical nature of the entire criminal
investigation. 46 Sánchez maintained his innocence throughout his eight year prison
sentence. He alleged Padre Meza had sent police investigators to detain certain people
from his religious community considered uncooperative members. Sánchez confirmed
Canoa experienced deep religious and political divisions between those who donated to
the church and those who did not. According to Sánchez, those who did not cooperate
were denounced as communists. Pánfilo Zepeda García, an indigenous man from Canoa,
vehemently denied any involvement in the lynching and yet received the longest prison
sentence out of any other suspects. According to Zepeda, he did not receive counsel
because he could not afford the 8,000 pesos needed for his defense. 47 Both García and
Sánchez spent their incarceration at San Juan de Dios state prison. None of the true
criminal masterminds were incarcerated.
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The Judicial Police of Puebla released their initial findings to the public on
September 19th, 1968. Their report declared Pánfilo Cepeda, Sebastián Manzano, Aurelio
Cepeda, Miguel Monarca, Andrewa Arce and Sebastián Cepeda incited Canoa’s residents
to attack the UAP employees. 48 However, none of the arrested served any prison time.
Initial press reports mentioned Enrique Meza, however not among those suspected as
being involved. Instead, the reports reviewed another version of Meza’s story
significantly different from the DFS report written after Meza visited the Puebla military
headquarters. Affirming his innocence throughout, Meza claimed on the night of the
lynching he overheard farmers shouting from outside the church, but could not do
anything to stop the swelling crowd. Meza reportedly peeked out the church window and
among the cornfields heard someone shouting, “Watch out he went that way, don’t let
him get away.” 49 In an obvious contradiction, Meza reported to be hard of hearing, but
could decipher shouting from long distances.
Initial government reports indicated police investigators discovered Martín Pérez
Arce, Canoa’s Municipal President within the lynch mob. 50 His presence confirms the
town’s leading figure was not simply an idle bystanders, but present at the scene, and
most probably involved in the attack. Arce was apprehended in Mexico City on March,
1969 after police investigators named him as one of the principal instigators of the
lynching. El Sol de Puebla reported that the lynching survivors confirmed to the
Delegation and Agency of Public Ministry that Arce was one of the first members from
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the lynch mob to burst into Lucas García’s house. 51 One can only imagine how Arce’s
presence in the mob psychologically charged and motivated the enraged crowd to inflict
violence on the suspected communists. The participation of a town’s political leader
undoubtedly fueled the needed justification to commit murder against the UAP
employees. Government documents also reported the link between Arce and Padre
Meza. The government suggested Arce enjoyed the priest’s personal confidence. 52 The
former PRI candidate won his election to become Municipal President of Canoa in the
1960s with allegations of corruption. 53
Arce’s frequent instances of public intoxication in Canoa suggests some residents
may have remembered him more as a drunkard than as the mayor. According to one
resident, the night of the lynching, Arce was “drunk as usual. 54 Some resident’s even
remembered Arce present in Canoa on the night of the lynching, a claim Arce initially
denied until his apprehension in 1969. In fact, Arce later publically admitted to “drinking
all day and all night,” on September 14th, but claimed his state of inebriation exonerated
him from any wrongdoing or responsibility.
The 1968 lynching shares strikingly similar characteristics with lynchings that
occurred in Canoa’s past, 112 years prior. In 1856, Mexico’s president Ignacio
Comonfort battled to contain massive political unrest between liberals and conservatives.
Mexico was plagued with isolated political uprisings, conservative discontent, and
mounting social tension between political forces that culminated with liberal efforts to
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construct a new constitution stripping the Church from its power. Before La Reforma,
Mexico’s civil war, San Miguel Canoa witnessed the growing anxieties first hand. Three
unknown persons in Canoa although appearing peaceful at first, exchanged arms with
some of the locals. 55 The three men roamed through town while certain residents
followed to keep a watchful eye. As the men walked peacefully passed the church, a
group of armed men, led by the priest Miguel Santa María, his brother, followed by the
mayor of the town, Manuel Pérez, and a large group of followers opened fire on the
outsiders. Two of the men were apparently killed immediately, while a third tried to
escape.
The church bells rang in a violent and alarming cacophony warning Canoa’s
residents to take action. Those who answered the general alarm encircled the escapee
and brought him to the town’s jail. The encounter came to a dramatic end when the priest
Santa María told the largely indigenous community that “if death was not brought to the
young man, San Miguel Canoa would be burned for having in its midst a wicked man.” 56
The cryptic warning provided the mayor and the town religious justification for murder.
The large indigenous group of men following the expressed orders of the town’s mayor,
Manuel Pérez, dragged the young man nearly a mile to a deep canyon, where they tied
him with a rope, shot him in the neck, and smashed his head with a large stone that
remained at the foot of a large tree.
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A subsequent investigation in 1857 discovered the main perpetrators had made “a
mistake” as the general pretext for the crime. Judge Juan N. Ibra called it an “enormous
error,” that led to the “horrific murders committed by the people of San Miguel Canoa,
headed by the two people who had the most to set an example of humility for the faithful
citizens: the priest and the mayor of the town.” 57 Canoa’s repeated examples of
lynching’s suggests a powerful correlation exists between sporadic and isolated acts of
communal violence and moments of rising national political tension. In Canoa, localized
power brokers acting as agents of state power often turned to violence when they felt
their power was threatened. Violence was therefore a calculated measure to preserve
Canoa’s fledging power structure. The murders committed by seemingly innocent
outsiders were in response to a liberal attack on the traditionally conservative power
structure. Religious leaders felt particularly threatened by the idea of losing government
support for their legitimacy. The 1856 lynching was in direct response to the
groundswell of national political tension, and the anxieties to local political order.
The Proceso article by Felipe Gálvez elucidates upon the cyclical violence found
in Canoa’s history. However, the article only provides the reader with a small indication
that these lynchings correlated with national events. The journalist offered only
summaries of each lynching without drawing larger conclusions between the lynchings.
What in fact, do these repeated instances of communal violence say about Canoa? It
would be too dismissive to label this town as culturally isolated, or explicitly prone to
violence. The unique cultural, religious, and political structure in Canoa played an
intricate part to the cyclical violence in its history.
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***
In the immediate aftermath of the Canoa lynching, numerous competing
narratives developed from within Canoa, and also the metropole, that tried to make sense
of the outbreak of communal violence. Each version offers a lens in which certain truths
are revealed about how Mexicans in Puebla experienced the Cold War. Exploring the
lynching and its immediate aftermath within Canoa and also outside confirms San Miguel
Canoa was not culturally isolated or separate as a traditional rural community but
intricately connected to mainstream Mexican politics, migration, and culture. Canoa’s
residents were deeply connected to the global cold war, the national political environment
under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and local and regional sociopolitical concerns.
These layers of political culture filtered into Canoa and were interpreted by the town’s
residents according to their historical experiences. Enrique Meza and Puebla’s statesanctioned newspaper El Sol de Puebla undoubtedly contributed to the local fears of
communism and young student protestors.
Viewed from outside the rural countryside, most people in Puebla could not
believe the “wild and savage epically archaic crime,” could occur in the 20th century, and
just 16 kilometers from Puebla, a city that “prides itself on being the leader of industrial
and cultural development.” 58 The lynchings revealed the hollownesse of President Díaz
Ordaz’s economic policies, and the general lack of state power felt in Mexico’s
countryside. In fact, Canoa’s severe economic problems and general lack of
socioeconomic development expose the larger truths about how rural Mexican’s
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experienced the “Mexican Miracle.” Rampant social inequality remained just a few
miles outside Puebla’s industrial core. Severe inequalities in Mexico’s poor and
primarily indigenous peripheral towns are problems that date back to the colonial
period. 59
The generally accepted narrative’s heavy emphasis and dependence on the
accounts from the UAP employees reshaped and decentered the lynching from including
the internal tensions ruminating within Canoa. The narrative took form outside of Canoa
and was shaped primarily by perspectives emanating from the metropole. Thus, Canoa’s
internal anxieties were largely overshadowed by the larger national forces. Many
journalists automatically connected the student movement and their negative portrayal in
the press as a prime factor that caused the Canoa lynchings. However, important details
about Canoa’s internal economic and political situation remained noticeably exempt from
these accounts. Exploring the other competing narratives reveals larger truths about rural
Mexico’s experience during the cold war, both from within Canoa and from Puebla. The
dominant narrative that formed became incorporated into the larger legacy of Mexico’s
fear of social change during the Cold War. Later on, the Canoa incident became
visualized in a popular film rendition of the lynching in 1975, a topic explored in the
following chapter. In many ways, the lynching exemplifies the experiences of Mexico in
1968, and signifies how national social tensions filtered throughout the country and
affected everyone, especially small communities where the presence of the state was all
but absent.
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Each competing version of the lynching offers a lens to view the larger
experiences of Mexico during the Cold War. Viewed separately, each narrative offers
insight into the mounting social tensions that enveloped Mexico. No individual narrative
tells the entire story or explains precisely what happened. Other portions of the Canoa
lynching need to be examined with greater depth. 60 For example, future research needs
to examine court proceedings and documents related to the lynchings criminal
investigation proceedings. The evidence in these documents (if they exist) would reveal
a fascinating new lens to view the lynching’s aftermath. One might wonder whether
court documents reveal any evidence of other possible motivations for the lynching. The
Governor of Puebla was under enormous pressure by the UAP to investigate the Canoa
lynching and bring justice to the victims. However, the investigation was ultimately
ineffective, hampered immediately by a lack of cooperation amongst Canoa’s residents to
piece together what happened. Despite multiple arrests, including the town’s mayor,
none of the intellectual planners served jail time.
When combined and analyzed, the competing narratives shed light on the
immense social anxieties that existed in Mexico’s countryside in the moments preceding
Tlatelolco during the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz. The Canoa lynching slowly
faded from public memory and was eventually overshadowed by the government
sponsored massacre on October 2, 1968. Only a few local newspapers in Puebla closely
followed the subsequent police investigation. It took seven years before Felipe Cazals
resurrected the memory of Canoa in a powerful fictional depiction aptly titled, Canoa
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released to Mexican audiences in 1975. Canoa remains an intricate part in the lynching’s
history, and also a powerful representation of Mexico in 1968, a segment to which we
now turn.
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CHAPTER 3: VISUALIZING AND REMEMBERING
In the wake of the Tlatelolco massacre on October 2, 1968, the memory of Canoa
faded into obscurity for many Mexicans living outside of Puebla. The State had
successfully smashed the student movement through the use of violence, intimidation,
mass arrests, torture, and faulty trials. Destroying the movement came with a tremendous
cost to the political legitimacy of the PRI. President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz publically
announced his full responsibility for the events at Tlatelolco in a speech given to the state
legislature. The political maneuver allowed Díaz Ordaz the opportunity to promote his
most loyal political confidant, Luis Echeverría, to be the tapado, the undisclosed
successor to the president. 1 As former Minister of the Interior, Echeverría is thought to
have been directly responsible for the massacre at Tlatelolco.
During his sexenio as President, (1970-1976) Echeverría tried to clean his hands
from ’68 and take control over the progressive principles fostered by the student
movement. He projected an image of himself as a populist president concerned with
ideas of social justice. 2 Echeverría’s principle tactic to neutralize the democratic threat
posed by the generation of ‘68 involved co-opting many prominent leftist intellectuals
into his political administration. Echeverría steered Mexico into a new political direction.
Despite his best efforts to reinvent himself as a national hero and the leader of the ‘Third
World’, Echeverría’s policies were mostly failures. Ultimately, he never erased his
association with Tlatelolco from public memory. 3 In fact, Echeverría’s presidency
continued the same methods of repression utilized by the Díaz Ordaz administration to
1
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control political dissidents. Echeverría oversaw Mexico’s own version of the Dirty War
while simultaneously commandeering the spirit of the student movement and promoting
left-wing causes. 4 This hypocritical domestic policy became known as Mexico’s socalled “democratic opening,” where the Mexican state relaxed its censorship of
newspapers and other medias, opening a brief moment of progressivism, and creating a
shift in political freedom most Mexicans had never experienced before. 5
In this chapter, I focus on the power of film representation in the production of
public memory by focusing on Canoa, released on March 4, 1976 by director Felipe
Cazals and screenwriter Tomás Pérez Turrent. This film presented Mexican audiences
with a dramatic fictional depiction of the hiker’s nightmare. The film remains an
intricate component of Canoa’s legacy and a powerful depiction of 1968 Mexico. I
contend Canoa has become the official public memory of the lynching. Due in part to
Cazals’ documentary-style production, the film influenced how Mexicans perceived the
rural countryside during the Cold War, and sanitized the historical memory of the Canoa
lynching in a manner that reflected the domestic political policies of President Luis
Echeverría.
The popular culture expert Jerome de Groot notes that historical film and allegory
are essential for film producers “to work through issues about the recent past, particularly
in relation to violence and national identity.” 6 Indeed, Canoa reconceptualized and
simplified the lynching into a narrative that visually blurred history. However, the film
4
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symbolized late 1960s Mexico, and became a reference point for audience members to
understand recent Mexican history. The film provided audiences with an emotionally
appealing depiction of the Canoa lynching that influenced popular perceptions and
culture. Film obviously remains an important medium for filtering history, and for
people to gather interpretations about the past. The audience members watching Canoa
in theatres undoubtedly knew the film was an allegory for 1968 Mexico, and likely
viewed the movie seeking explanations for the recent past during the Díaz Ordaz
administration that culminated with the bloody Tlatelolco massacre.
Canoa also created a visual template that later influenced how historians and
journalists viewed the lynching. In other words, Cazals’ fictional depiction became the
dominant memory of the lynching that in many ways gained authenticity and continued
to influence how Mexicans perceived Canoa and its inhabitants. In one sense, Felipe
Cazals untangled the multiple social narratives that developed in the lynching’s aftermath
and made sense of what happened in the rural community. The film rescued and
preserved the faded memory of the Canoa lynching and created a sustained historic
interest in the event and the town that remains to the present. 7
However, the film negatively portrayed Canoa’s residents, and insinuated a
message to audiences that the lynching was primarily driven by communal bloodlust,
religious manipulation, and public ignorance. Canoa reintroduced certain tropes and
perceptions that have periodically appeared in the official histories of Mexico. 8 These
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tropes center on the traditional image of the pueblo: drunken townspeople staggering
down unpaved streets, male residents fearful of social change, a powerful priest assisted
by passive women obediently subservient to his instruction, a fanatically devoted flock
who adheres to religious order, and ultimately, a hostile and ignorant public who at a
moment’s notice explodes into unprecedented violence against innocent people. The film
also altered the history and made Canoa and its indigenous residents appear backward,
barbaric, ignorant, and fanatically devoted to the Catholic Church. These stereotypes are
common perceptions of el pueblo dating back hundreds of years. These tropes are also
found in Mexican cinema, most notably in María Candelaria (Fernández, 1944). In that
film, a beautiful indigenous woman named in the title (Dolores del Rio) from an
undisclosed pueblo in rural Mexico became the village outcast. The film depicts many
familiar tropes of el pueblo. Later, María agreed to model in a sexually provocative pose
for a painter from the big city, in exchange for money she needed to release her husband
from the local jail. One resident discovers her in the scandalous pose and returns to the
village, where the indigenous community turns hostile against her, culminating with
María being stoned to death in front of the village jail. The villagers turned to communal
violence to save the reputation of their town.
Canoa reinforced many of these preexisting stereotypes of Mexico’s countryside
and focused almost entirely on the UAP employee’s accounts, as written by the
screenwriter Tomás Pérez Turrent. Many historians and journalists were influenced by
Cazals’ film and filtered their depiction of events using the visual template of Canoa. The
Jockey Club and other Episodes of Porfirian Mexico(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2004); James
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film’s negative representation of the countryside helped produce a black legend of Canoa
that cast a shadow over the community to the very present. In the summer of 2012,
during a research trip to Puebla, this researcher noticed evidence suggesting the film
continues to influence how Poblanos view Canoa. 9 Though this evidence remains very
anecdotal, it suggests the film continues to influence how Mexicans perceive the rural
countryside. Besides the film, what else could have contributed to this fearful perception
of Canoa? Where did this public memory derive from?
Other historical examples are more concrete and shed light on the manner in
which journalists filtered their negative perspective of Canoa and its inhabitants through
Cazals’ version of events. One Contenido article published several weeks after Canoa’s
release in Mexico’s theaters was exceptional in its negative representation of Canoa’s
inhabitants, and its dependence on traditional stereotypes of people from el pueblo. The
article’s front page is accompanied with a picture of Tomasa García Arce, the widow of
Lucas García who was killed the night of the lynching. Standing barefoot on the dusty
ground, wearing traditional clothing wrinkled and worn, a young, melancholy Tomasa
holds a faded portrait of her late husband. Yet her harmless characteristics quickly fade
away when one reads the introductory paragraph. Immediately, the journalist’s
reintroduced familiar tropes commonly associated with the people del pueblo. Ascensión
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Flores is described as, “a tall man, white, his face pockmarked, standing motionless but
with a menacing attitude behind Tomasa Arce, his wife. A third man, a friend of the
couple, leaned against the wall, too drunk to move and posing a hazard.” 10 The journalist
depicts Arce and her community using familiar tropes visually depicted in Cazals’ film,
and throughout the history of Mexico. The journalists describe her threatening attitude
immediately. According to the article, at a moment’s notice, and without reason Arce
shouted an obscenity at the journalists before she ran into her house and produced a
double-barrel shotgun. Pointing the weapon at the men, she only lowered the weapon
after accepting 100 pesos. The reader understands the indigenous woman would threaten
physical harm to obtain a relatively small sum of money. Just a minute earlier, Tomasa
had been “a cheerful Indian” dimple cheeked, with four or five children (the journalists
lost count) “snaked between her legs, with their eyes glazed over by pulque.” Flores, the
“current husband” of Arce, “just kept drinking pulque from his drinking bowl.” Despite it
being before 11 in the morning, “everyone was already drunk.” 11 The reader later learns
Arce has three additional children who go hungry since she cannot provide for them.
These tropes are interwoven throughout the Contenido article, reinforcing the common
belief Canoa’s residents were backward, hostile, and uneducated Indians. These tropes
were very similar to those depicted in Cazals film to describe Canoa’s inhabitants.
With the March, 1976 release of Canoa emerged a renewed public interest in the
lynching. This is evident by the number of featured articles printed in the weeks
following the film’s release. Articles depicting the movie and the lynching appeared in
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newspapers, books, and other publications. 12 San Miguel Canoa suddenly became a
tourist location for journalists moved by the film’s early success in Mexican theaters.
Canoa was rediscovered and its history retold, often through the lens created by Cazals
and Turrent. Canoa should be credited with building a richer history of the lynching as
historians and journalists documented the town’s background in far greater detail than
initial newspaper accounts, often limited to regional presses in Puebla. Researchers
secured interviews with many prominent figures portrayed in the film, including Roberto
Rojano, Julián González, Miguel Flores Cruz, Enrique Meza, and Tomasa García Arce.
These accounts often reflected upon the film in relation to their own version of events,
demonstrating just how significant Canoa played in shaping the memory of the lynching.
According to the pioneering work of Robert Robenstone, visual media offers a
powerful lens for historians to view the different social and cultural attitudes of a specific
era. Robenstone contends the investigation of fictional visual media is an important
cultural entity historians can use to help think about their relationships with the past. 13
As Robenstone points out, most fictional and documentary-style films simplify history
and overemphasize dramatic events to generate a desired emotion from the audience.
Films often reflect the societal moods and opinions of their time, and Canoa was no
exception.
In many ways, Canoa epitomized the Echeverría years. The film visually
constructed an ideology that appeared to promote greater freedom of expression while
simultaneously conforming to Echeverría’s officially sanctioned state policy. Echeverría
12

Many of these publications are presented in the citations used throughout this thesis.
Robert A. Rosenstone, Visions of the Past: The Challenge of Film to Our Idea of History (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995), 3.

13

87
projected an image of himself as a populist President deeply connected with the heart of
Mexican culture. He distanced from his repressive past during the Díaz Ordaz years by
promoting greater freedom to artists and intellectuals, such as Felipe Cazals. 14 As
Mexican citizens came to terms with the violent repression of their own government,
Canoa attempted to erase the bloody memory of Tlatelolco by presenting the state and
the Mexican army in favorable terms. The film also promoted President Echeverría’s
ideas of progress and modernity while simultaneously condemning the role of the
Catholic Church.
Though it is beyond the scope of this study to describe the history of Mexican
cinema in the 20th Century, it is necessary to briefly summarize the state’s involvement
with the production of Mexican cinema. This background is necessary to understand
how the memory of the Canoa lynching and 1968 Mexico became heavily filtered
through Cazals and the state. Other researchers have already explored the rich history of
Mexican cinema and in particular Canoa in much greater detail. 15 Though my project is
not a frame by frame film analysis, I depend on these other works to set the background
for the Echeverría period when Canoa was released into theaters.
Echeverría’s new liberalized vision for Mexico redesigned many of the state’s
previous economic and cultural policies. These reforms extended into Mexico’s national
film industry. The state began its vestige interest with film production in the late 1950s.
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By the late 1960s, the state-owned Banco Nacional Cinematográfico (BNC) financed 90
percent of all film production, demonstrating the state’s major influence and participation
in Mexican cinema. 16 These accelerated changes with state involvement in Mexico’s
cinema were deeply connected with the massive democratic action in late 1960s
Mexico. 17

Unlike his authoritarian predecessor, Echeverría appreciated the Mexican

film industry, especially since his brother Rodolfo was a famous actor who starred in a
number of popular films. Presidential powers and nepotism allowed Echeverría to
appoint his brother Rodolfo to head the BNC, which by the 1970s became the official
film producer in Mexico. During Echeverría’s sexenio, the state owned 60 percent of all
movie theaters and controlled the production for 95 percent of all Mexican films. 18
Rodolfo Echeverría announced on January 21, 1971 the “Plan for the Restructure
of the Mexican Film Industry,” implementing new reforms to completely overhaul the
Mexican cinema and remove the old establishment of conservative private producers
whose films did not reflect the product envisioned in state goals. Echeverría sought to
“change the image of the national cinema, so deteriorated and maligned at the beginning
of the decade.” 19 Through the establishment of a new credit system, the old-guard who
controlled Mexico’s film production became virtually excluded from the state’s control
over the market. The Echeverría film project was an extension of the President’s liberal
vision for Mexico. It allowed the state to revamp and liberalize the film industry, while
also ensuring total control over the discourse and content.
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One of the most important developments involved the state’s creation of three
production companies between 1974 and 1975, named the Corporacion Nacional
Cinematográfica (CONACINE), the Corporacion Nacional Cinematográfica de
Trabajadores y Estado I (CONACITE I); and the Corporacion Nacional Cinematográfica
de Trabajadores y Estado II (CONACITE II). With almost entire control over Mexico’s
film industry, the state used these companies to facilitate the production and distribution
of a new era of “package” films that explored Echeverría’s new cultural vision of
Mexico. State control also ensured proper state supervision over film content. For
example, a typical film first needed the screenplay to be reviewed by state censors. If the
screenplay passed inspection, “inspectors” were often sent to observe the physical
production of the film. After completion, it was sent to the Director General de la
Cinemotografica del Secretaria de Gobernacion, where the state decided whether the film
was permissible for release. This system of state management in film production
controlled cinematic content, and infused the state’s sanctioned ideology within approved
films. 20
With funding from the BNC, and with the Echeverría brothers guiding a new
liberalized yet state endorsed conception of Mexican cinema, CONACINE produced its
first “package” film Canoa by director Felipe Cazals. Canoa retells the fictionalized
account of the UAP employee’s doomed hiking trip to La Malinche and a disturbing
visual dramatization of the lynching’s.

Cazals utilized a fake documentary-style in the

beginning of the film that certainly captured the audience’s attention. This configuration
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of the “apparent” using different styles and genres was analyzed with assistance from
Alex Phillips Jr., the director of photography.
Cazals informed this author during an August 2012 interview that he configured
Canoa into six different tempos. 21 The film began with the text “this did happen” and an
overture: two reporters communicating by telephone and reporting the facts and figures
about the lynching. The journalists repeated the distorted information initially published
in Excélsior on September 15, 1968, that blamed the victims for what happened. 22 As
Historian John Mraz notes, Cazals purposely used this misleading article as part of his
criticism of the media. The film version removed one important sentence from the
Excélsior article that explained the judicial police of Puebla were sent to Canoa to control
the enraged mob. In Cazals’ second tempo, the audience views a fictionalized black and
white reportage of the lynching’s aftermath. The camera moves erratically, capturing the
somber faces of Canoa’s male villagers looking down at the dead corpses lying in the
street. The villagers appear in traditional clothing and wearing sombreros. Women are
noticeably absent from this scene. Most significantly are the Granaderos, or grenadiers
armed with rifles and wearing the distinctive metal helmets with a crest running down the
center. Mexico’s notorious riot police appear hostile and shove the unarmed residents
away with their rifles. The audience watching Canoa in 1976 undoubtedly recognized
this scene as an allegory for the repressive Díaz Ordaz years, when tens of thousands of
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student protestors called for an abolishment of the Granaderos, disgracefully known for
their long history of abusive treatment towards civilians. 23
The third tempo utilized a “mockumentary” of San Miguel Canoa that gave the
audience an overview of Canoa’s local conditions narrated-over in documentary fashion.
The audience hears and sees the sordid condition of the villagers and the surrounding
areas. This documentary-style helped historicized Cazals’ fictionalized account, and
presented audiences with official information about the town’s residents and their culture.
I would argue this documentary form allowed the audience to digest the tropes Cazals
depicted of the countryside: a campesino walking a donkey down an unpaved street, long
stretches of road with no cars in sight, barren landscapes, and decaying walls passed by a
barefoot child herding chickens down a dirt road in the middle of the day. The audience
hears the population drinks pulque instead of water, confirming the truly backwards
nature of the town.
Cazals’ fourth tempo used a village Everyman who represents the village
conscience and narrates directly to the camera critical information about Canoa and its
residents. 24 Cazals called this man “The Witness,” a local “peasant, cunning, evasive
when it suits, whistleblower if you fancy, often ironic, serving as a bridge for the
continuity of history and becomes a valuable counterpoint” to the film’s overall structure
and narrative. 25 Cazals depends on this character to provide omnipotent commentary
that connects the film viewer with Canoa’s local intricacies, and ties the film together
from beginning to end.
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Cazals transitions to the fifth tempo, the central story following the UAP
employees from their initial planning stages in Puebla to their subsequent voyage and
eventual interaction in Canoa. During this portion of the film preceding the impending
nightmare, Cazals used wide camera angles to make the audience feel like distanced
observers. 26 The suspense thickens with the ringing of the church bells and the dramatic
scene of machete wielding peasants running towards Lucas García’s home. The graphic
killings and violent beatings of the survivors culminate with an important scene where
the enraged crowd encircles the battered victims, ready to finish them off. At the last
possible second, the blue helmeted Granaderos arrive to protect the innocent UAP
employees before the ambulance whisks the injured off to the hospital.
During the final tempo, Canoa enters the epilogue: Daily life in Canoa returns
back to normal a few days later, as if nothing happened. A body is laid to rest,
presumably that of Lucas García, however only a few villagers attend his funeral. A few
weeks later, Canoa’s residents are depicted celebrating in the streets during a religious
festival. A group of men dance in traditional clothing decorated in elaborate colors. A
sizeable crowd watches intently as fireworks are launched from a distance. As the
villagers celebrate, “The Witness” appears and notices the camera filming him. He turns
away, refusing his obligation to deliver to the audience omnipotent details about what had
happened. During this curious scene, the camera pans to follow “The Witness” trying to
flee. Running up a flight of stairs, he suddenly notices another camera crew. Cornered,
he grudgingly returns to the bottom of the stairs, approaches the camera just as the music
dies down. The sound of a film reel spinning induces the sensation he is about to
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announce a profound truth about what happened. In supreme irony, “The Witness” states
that if San Miguel Canoa was bad before, now it was worse! 27 Finally, the village priest,
Enrique Meza is seen leading a religious procession down an unpaved street. Villagers
hoist the Archangel while singing a religious melody. As the film cuts to black, the
viewer reads text explaining there was no real justice for the slain victims despite a
criminal investigation. 28
The film rendition of the Canoa lynching offered a window for audiences to
visualize life in Mexico’s countryside during the Cold War. When Canoa was released
into Mexican theaters, audiences were most likely educated, middle class city-dwellers
who identified with Mexico’s growing consumer culture. Cazals’ visualization of
Mexico’s countryside helped described the competing visions of Mexican society,
between the modern industrial culture found in the big cities, and the underdeveloped and
traditional society in the countryside. Mexicans probably filtered these visualized
perceptions through their own identity, and understood the cultural perceptions and
stereotypes used by Cazals to describe el pueblo. The law and the state are visibly
stronger in larger cities, whereas the state appears less connected in the countryside.
Thus, the local population appears suspicious, violent, uneducated, reactionary, and
unfamiliar to the social intricacies and cultural practices provided in more civilized parts
of Mexico.
In many ways, Canoa echoes the prominent theme of progressivism echoed in
other mainstream movies from the 1970s, like Deliverance (Boorman, 1972). In that
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film, a group of survivalist men (Jon Voight, Burt Reynolds, Ned Beatty) from the bigcity escape to the U.S. countryside to reconnect with nature. They encounter a
dilapidated community abandoned by industrial capitalism, and seemingly isolated from
the metropole. The men seem capable of conquering this unchartered territory because
they are educated, and from a major city. Thus, they can comprehend the intricacies of
this simple community without much problem. However, like Canoa, their adventure
turns into a full-fledged nightmare. A local is killed, and then men are able to dispose of
the body because in this rural area, the law is noticeably absent, and vigilante justice is
justifiable. Ultimately, the surviving adventures eventually escape. Just before forever
leaving the dangerous countryside, a sheriff deputy deeply suspicious of the men and
probably aware of their crimes lets them go with a warning: “Don’t come back around
here. I’d like to see this town die peacefully.” 29 The adventurers are therefore protected
by the state structured society in the big city. Like Canoa, the film reinforces certain
preexisting tropes about the rural countryside that disregard local factors and conditions
Miguel Flores Cruz, reflecting on Canoa believed the film was roughly 90%
accurate to the UAP employee’s version of events. CONACINE provided Cruz and the
other UAP survivors 25,000 pesos each for their help in production, and 5,000 pesos for
the widows of the fallen UAP employees. The survivors asked if they could receive a
percentage from the film’s profit, however package films produced through the state
corporation could not offer this. Instead, CONACINE offered to charge $100 pesos per
seat at the opening premier to benefit the men, however this also fell through. 30 The
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UAP survivors received small roles in the film, but did not appear in the credits or
receive invitations to the film’s premiere in Mexico City. 31 In Canoa, resident Serafín
Flores Manzana headed a commission of neighbors that interviewed Rodolfo Echeverría,
president of the BNC, with the explicit hope Echeverría would direct a portion of the
film’s profits be reallocated into Canoa and invested into the construction of schools.
“What happened was because of ignorance,” stated Flores, “We need to give the children
history so that it does not happen again.” 32 Significantly, Canoa had to be filmed in Santa
Rita Tlahuapan, Puebla, and not on location due to fears from producers they might
accidentally document their own lynching. 33
Film critics quickly recognized Canoa to be an obvious allegory for the Tlatelolco
massacre, and a symbol for the repressive violence inflicted by the Mexican government
in 1968. 34 Immediately after the second tempo, Cazals depicts the UAP employee
funeral protest march and the army’s own preplanned military parade on September 16,
1968. As John Mraz observes, this scene is “a red herring that references the memory of
the army’s participation in the Tlatelolco massacre to anticipate what the audience
expects will be the movie’s story.” 35 In addition to Mraz, I would also argue the scene
recasts a positive memory of Mexico’s state power during the late 1960s, as a paternal
force that acted with the highest of intentions to preserve peace between protestors and
the military.
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During the scene, the drums from the military band grow in intensity, as the
audience anticipates an inevitable altercation between the protest march and the military
who are marching towards each other. However, just before clashing, unidentified men
wearing suits, trench coats and sunglasses—who appear to be undercover security
agents—emerge from the crowd and form a barrier for the protestors. These men
appeared to have infiltrated the funeral march and emerge in the nick of time to force the
protestors and the army to divert towards the left.
During this powerful cinematic moment, three branches of Mexico’s society are
visualized for the audience in a scene that I view as recasting the memory of Echeverría’s
role in 1968, Tlatelolco, and the Díaz Ordaz years more broadly. State power is
represented by the security agents who stand equidistance between the general population
and the military. On one side, the state comes to the protection of the protestors, securing
their democratic rights to protest under Luís Echeverría’s newly promoted “democratic
opening.” At first, the bulky security agents demonstrate their bravery to protect the
marchers by positioning their bodies in a firm posture towards the military with their legs
and arms spread firmly apart. After a matter of seconds, the state agents appear less
threatening. Their backs are turned towards the camera while some agents clasp their
hands passively behind their back or into their pockets. Their feet shift closer together,
relaxing their strong outward appearance once it becomes apparent the civilian marchers
are conforming to the wishes of the state to veer left and avoid conflict with the military.
The state continues to carefully watch over the protestors, making sure they adhere to
state order and control. However, the state agents also maintain an equal distance from
the army, symbolizing Echeverría’s attempt to promote an image of him and the state as

97
separate from military power. This also attempted to refashion the memory of Echeverría
and Tlatelolco, where the state directed the military to attack the nonviolent student
protestors. During the scene, the army dutifully follows its orders to diverge left and
avoid conflict, inculcating a memory that the army was innocent from any wrongdoing at
Tlatelolco. 36 The security agents maintain their vigilance and surveillance, glancing back
and forth to ensure neither the army nor the protestors try to break the symbolic
representation of state power (see figure 1). This important scene shows the state as the
unquestioned savior of the people, protecting them from past abuses from the military. It
recasts the memories of state repression from the Díaz Ordaz years when the weakened
state power depended on the disproportional use of force administered by the military
against the student protestors. When Canoa entered Mexican theaters this was
undoubtedly remembered by everyone in the audience.
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0.1 The state security forces are shown protecting the funeral march from confronting the
military parade. Frame enlargement from Canoa, Felipe Cazals. DVD. Produced by
CONACINE/STPC, 1975.

The scene describes the benevolent nature of Mexico’s state during 1968, and
inculcates a positive memory to the audience that the state was the unquestioned savior
preserving the peace during the turbulent years in the late 1960s. As Mraz correctly
observes, “The expected battle of students and soldiers has been avoided thanks to the
state’s planning, which has foreseen that eventuality and designed the marcher’s routes so
that they would not run into one another.” When Canoa was released into Mexican
theatres, the audience surely understood the significance of this vital scene as an allegory
to Tlatelolco, or at the very least, as an important symbol of the army repression against
unarmed democratic protestors under the presidency of Díaz Ordaz. The audience also
would have remembered president Echeverría’s intimate role within the Díaz Ordaz
years, dutifully participating as his predecessor’s Minister of the Interior and Mexico’s
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top policeman. 37 Echeverría undoubtedly received security updates from the Dirección
Federal de Seguridad, Mexico’s version of the FBI, which monitored the student
movement very closely and infiltrated many of the CNH meetings. 38
One of the only English accounts to describe the Canoa lynching appears briefly
within Plaza of Sacrifices, by Elaine Carey. Carey analyzes Mexico City’s student
movement and part of Mexico’s counterculture in 1968 using a gendered analysis to
explain how the movement gained influence from internal and external forces. 39 In her
segment that focuses on the lynching, Carey connects Díaz Ordaz’s propaganda
campaign against the student movement and the equally negative sentiment printed in the
national press as significant motivators that contributed to the communal violence
unleashed against the UAP employees.
Carey’s analysis of the lynching is a minor detail in her study which focuses
primarily on the student movement. However, she uses Cazals’ film for one of her
citations, along with a misleading Excélsior article from September 15, 1968. 40 Her
reliance on the film perpetuates Cazals’ fictionalized version of events as an objective
account of what happened. Carey depends on this version, which, while emphasizing
Canoa’s fears of communism, ignores the equally significant social anxieties that existed
in the town like the CCI, the cattle rustlers, local agricultural problems, and the systemic
political corruption. Carey is therefore only partially correct when she asserts Canoa’s
“townspeople assumed that the young men from Puebla were sympathetic to the student
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uprising in Mexico City, to communism, and therefore enemies to the Mexican nation
and the Catholic Church.” Her analysis of the lynching also derives from a film study by
Jorge Azala Blanco, and an interview with Felipe Cazals, once again, reaffirming Cazals’
fictional depiction as historical truth.
Carey also erroneously states Miguel Flores Cruz died in a hospital from injuries
sustained in the attack. She apparently mistranslated the September 18, 1968 El Heraldo
article about the lynching that actually reported Cruz escaped with his life by “feigning
death.” 41 Of course, Flores Cruz not only survived the attack, but provided some of the
most reliable detailed accounts of the lynching, including his latest interview in 2008. 42
In concluding, Carey posits in 1968 “the attacks did not seem to be related to the
Mexican student movement, but the attacks can not be separated from the fact that the
townspeople attacked the young men because they assumed they were activists from the
Federal District.” 43 In fact, the reality is quite contrary to her assertions. Overwhelming
evidence suggests many people in and around Canoa, Puebla, and Mexico City
immediately recognized the deep connection between the lynchings and the 1968 student
movement. 44 It is probably unfair to unjustly criticize Carey’s work since her segment on
Canoa is only an overview of events and not the essential feature of her book. After all,
Carey not only connected the Canoa lynchings in Mexico’s countryside with the student
movement, but also with the national press, and the cultural representations used to
describe young people in 1968. Her segment on Canoa is also one, if not the only
41
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English account to describe the event with much detail. However, my research indicates
Canoa became a visual template used by historians and journalists to filter their
interpretation.
Cazals’ film replaced many of the competing social narratives in the Canoa
lynching’s history, and obscured the larger memory of Mexico’s experiences during the
Cold War. The film also obscures many of the underlying tensions within San Miguel
Canoa, such as cattle rustling, crop failures, frustrations to national economic policies,
and local political corruption. Canoa’s film cannot be viewed as a separate entity
autonomous to the overall history of the lynching. It remains an intricate component, as
evident from its citations that appear in historical works several decades later. It is also a
significant part of the lynching’s history that has become the official public memory, and
a visual template used to explore Canoa’s community and a lens into Mexico’s
experiences during the 1960s.
The film Canoa refashioned an image of Mexico’s state as the benevolent,
paternal savior for the weak and helpless, and a rational actor in defense of law abiding
Mexicans. The film also inculcated an image of the state in conflict with the backwardnature of el pueblo and the manipulative tendencies of the Catholic Church. The pueblo,
long described with nostalgia by post-revolutionary administrations, became a menacing
threat during the Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría presidencies, as rural Mexicans organized
against local injustices and national policies. While Echeverría tried to resurrect the
populism and legacy of Lázaro Cárdenas, he also sent troops to suppress rural Mexicans
who opposed the PRI, most notably Lucio Cabañas, an anti-government guerilla who
conducted an insurgency campaign against the government in the late 1960s, and early
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1970s, and was killed by Mexican troops in December, 1974. The Mexican army’s
counterinsurgency campaign in Guerrero utilized state terror, disappearances, torture, and
assassinations against rural guerrilla movements during Mexico’s own version of the
“Dirty War.” 45 Cabañas and other rural guerilla activists represented the pueblo, which
had become very dangerous and posed a threat to greater Mexico. The depiction of
Canoa in the film thus confirmed the government’s evolving view toward rural Mexico
namely that the inhabitants of small towns are backwards and potentially subversive. As
the film depicts quite clearly, Canoa’s inhabitants were irrational, uneducated, and in a
state of perpetual decay in conflict with modernity and progressivism.
Thus, the film depicted the PRI in a positive light, obscuring the memory of the
violent repression in the late 1960s by then president Díaz Ordaz and his Interior
Minister, Luis Echeverría. The film also attempted to erase the bloody memory of
Tlatelolco by presenting the state as the benevolent protector of social rights and order.
The army is shown defending state orders and respecting the rights of protestors, a clear
allegory to the Tlatelolco massacre. The film also depicted the Church, long the bane of
the post-revolutionary government, as cruel, manipulative, and violent, perhaps
resurrecting the memory of the Cristero Revolt. Canoa altered the lynching in a way that
conformed to a state sanitized version, absent of criticism to national economic policies
which proved disastrous to Mexico’s rural countryside. The film produced a narrative
that blamed the town’s powerful priest and the manipulated and stupid inhabitants for the
violence. The power of Cazals popular visualization of Canoa also pushed aside certain
45
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competing narratives, namely that the town reacted to the UAP employees not only out of
fear imposed by certain perpetrators, but also by frustrations from political, economic,
and climatic factors.
As the Mexican state modernized, traditional Mexico was abandoned to make
way for rapid industrialization and a consumer culture. These national policies produced
tensions and frustrations evidence in the Canoa lynching. Canoa’s residents felt multiple
layers of local, regional, and national anxieties connected to the policies of the PRI, and
Mexico’s national Cold War period. Canoa’s residents were not culturally isolated or
ignorant of these developments, but instead deeply connected to the metropole through
culture, migration, and politics.
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CONCLUSION
On December 25, 1969, the Los Angeles Times ran an article reporting three Puebla
state police officers patrolling San Miguel Canoa, persuaded an angry mob from lynching
Ernesto and Antonio Bartolia, two brothers accused by villagers for the crime of
cheating. According to police, the villagers set up a court, and condemned the brothers to
be hanged from a tree in Canoa’s zócalo. As the Bartolia brothers prepared to die, with
nooses already tied around their necks, the police intervened and stopped the lynching.
However, the police could only watch as the people’s court “of village elders” imposed a
$64 fine against the brothers, and an additional $16 charge for the “crime of cheating.”
With the physical absence of a strong Mexican state, Canoa’s villagers once again
rationalized the use of vigilante justice against individuals deemed criminally guilty of
crimes against the community. The article claimed San Miguel Canoa had been made
“famous for taking the law in its own hands,” alluding to the lynching’s that occurred
there on September 14, 1968. 1
The lynchings in Canoa represent a microcosm of rural Mexico’s experiences during
the Cold War. As my research indicates, very powerful social tensions enveloped rural
Mexico during the 1960s, especially during the presidency of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz.
Canoa’s residents were intricately connected to the pulse of Mexico’s mainstream
society, and understood, quite well, the global Cold War, the national political
environment under President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, and the many layers of sociopolitical
1
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concerns found nationally, regionally and locally. These layers of political culture
filtered into Canoa and were interpreted by the town’s residents according to their own
historical opinions and experiences. Canoa’s residents shared connections with the
mainstream through newspapers, politics, migration, and culture. The national political
and economic policies during the Díaz Ordaz’s years were not exempt from effecting
seemingly isolated villages in Mexico’s countryside. In fact, analyzing the Canoa
lynching indicates these policies were magnified in rural villages. It is perhaps ironic and
also symbolic that the famous Canoa lynchings occurred in Puebla, in the very state Díaz
Ordaz grew up in and gained his political reputation as an unchallengeable power.
Puebla was the traditional bastion for the PRI, and the location for strong conservative
support among rural Mexicans. The Canoa lynching exposed the harsh realities of Díaz
Ordaz’s national policies that abandoned rural farmers and attacked and demonized
middle-class student activists. Puebla became an early battleground for student activism
in the 1960s. The Mexican state responded to the rise of student protests by supporting
right-wing groups like the Santillanistas, who terrorized democratic protestors.
In Canoa, the absence of state power allowed the village priest, the traditional head of
small communities in Mexico, to represent the portrait of political authority. As a priest,
Enrique Meza became more powerful than most other politically elected leaders.
Appointed into his position of religious authority by ecclesiastic authorities, Meza did not
need to contend with the political brake of elections or Mexico’s lack of consecutive
terms. Meza benefited and boasted about his strong political ties with local and regional
political leaders who supported the PRI. The PRI could depend on Meza’s loyalty, and
special role as Canoa’s spiritual and political leader. When Meza originally entered
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Canoa, he profoundly affected the village’s social dynamics. He positioned himself as an
image of Mexican state power, and played the role of a quasi-state actor that filled the
absence or weakness of state power in the rural countryside.
In 1968, most of Canoa’s farmers were deeply affected by Mexico’s rapid industrial
development known as the Mexican “Miracle.” Canoa’s primarily agricultural-based
economy declined during Mexico’s flourishing economic period, as most farmers and
their families remained in a precarious position susceptible to markets and the political
decisions from the Díaz Ordaz administration. Canoa’s residents were further victimized
by local systems of political corruption designed by elites to disproportionately levy taxes
from rural farmers. A small elite of cacique pulqueros also hired armed thugs who
oversaw an elaborate cattle rustling racket, further devastating Canoa’s farmers and
adding to their mounting anger and frustrations. A series of crop failures, and an
economic crisis in Puebla further compounded their hardships.
All of these mounting tensions mixed into the larger context of the Cold War Mexico,
where the state experienced a serious challenge to its political legitimacy by the
democratic forces of the student movement, and the rise of Mexico’s counterculture.
Fears of communist subversion spread across Mexico, including San Miguel Canoa,
which experienced the same anxieties of political and cultural change as other Mexicans.
Located in close proximity to Puebla, Canoa was connected to the big city through
culture, migration, and politics. Residents were connected to El Sol de Puebla and other
media outlets, which disseminated the national tensions to the student protestors on the
UAP campus and the nationwide fears of communism. However, Canoa’s residents were
not ignorant. They recognized the biased nature of the national press which regurgitated

107
the political sentiment of Díaz Ordaz, who vociferously condemned the student
movement as a vital threat to the nation.
It is evident some of Canoa’s residents were also influenced and manipulated by the
rhetoric extolled by Enrique Meza, who linked the local branch of the CCI with tacit
support for communism. Evidence suggests Meza sowed fear of communism into his
religious sermons and denounced Canoa’s CCI supporters as threats to Canoa’s social
order. Meza felt vulnerable, and his political power was threatened by the local presence
of the CCI. As an effective power broker and an image of state power, Meza replicated
the national fears of communism and cultural change. Meza felt susceptible and insecure
to his position of power, and acted in a way that projected his fears during moments of
crisis. Though he was never formally charged or criminally investigated for his
participation in the Canoa lynching, there is little doubt he played a major role in sowing
the seeds of conflict and violence, and manipulated his pulpit into responding to the
imaginary threats posed by the UAP employees.
The violence inflicted upon Lucas García, Odilón Sanchez, and the UAP employees
resulted from a deadly mixture of pent up political and economic frustrations felt by
Canoa’s residents, along with heightened fears of communism, the student movement,
radical social change, and the tensions of the Cold War. The UAP employees were likely
confused with students from the UAP School of Economics, who had visited just days
prior to their trip, with hopes of linking up with Canoa’s local branch of the CCI. These
same student activists were accused of raising a red and black flag on Canoa’s flagpole,
stealing animals, and looting from a local store. Incredibly, these accusations mirrored
Mexico’s national tensions but also local frustrations found throughout Canoa’s
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community. Significantly, these accusations identify the deep-seeded problems found in
Canoa, and how its residents were deeply connected with the national political
environment emanating from the metropole. Undoubtedly, Canoa’s residents
experienced the Cold War very similarly to other Mexicans.
Lynchings are often viewed as culturally isolated phenomenon, yet the Canoa
lynching indicates rural frustrations and collective violence, often connected with periods
of national crisis, feed local violence. In the case of Canoa, the violence inflicted and
directed against the UAP employees was organized by residents in response to an
immediate threat that they posed on the town’s social order. In Hannah Arendt’s wellknown study On Violence, she argues violence is often implemented when structures of
power and authority feel threatened by challenges to their control. Thus, violence is
directed by states or other entities against threats to the current social order. 2
Whether in fact Enrique Meza was the criminal mastermind behind the Canoa
lynching, he could not have single handedly directed the lynching and controlled the
outcome without the careful support of individual perpetrators who collectively
responded to the calls to attack the supposed communist infiltrators. The UAP
employees were likely confused for the UAP School of Economics students in town just
days prior to their arrival. The UAP empoyees also entered the house of Lucas García, a
known critic of Enrique Meza and a local CCI supporter. Suspicion and fears inevitably
spread that the young-looking men from the University of Puebla were conspiring to
disrupt the town’s social order. In the summer of 1968, the University had its reputation
embroiled within the larger narrative of the student movement, and was viewed as a hub
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of subversive activities. In 1968, the student movement strikes spread across most of the
UAP campus, creating a very tense political moment for all of Puebla. Therefore, it was
likely assumed by some of Canoa’s residents that the supposed student outsiders who
identified with the UAP were in town for malicious reasons. The violence directed
against the UAP employees, Lucas García, and Odilón Sanchez was fueled by the
national fears of communism, and the intense political, economic, and social frustrations
experienced by most of Canoa’s residents.
In the immediate aftermath of the lynching, various social narratives developed that
tried to make sense of what happened. Each version offers a lens in which to view how
Mexicans remembered the lynching, and constructed separate versions. Several of the
most powerful versions came from the UAP survivors, the local and national newspapers,
government investigators, resident eyewitnesses, the police, and the priest, Enrique Meza.
Analyzing the Canoa lynching’s aftermath also provides a powerful lens to view the
larger issues of community, power, and memory in 1968, in Díaz Ordaz’s Mexico. In the
lynching’s immediate aftermath, noticeable fissures emerged throughout Puebla and
Mexico City. Depending on their perspective, Mexican’s viewed the lynching in
different ways. Some viewed the incident to be directly connected with the national
anxieties caused by the student movement and the national newspapers. However, the
dominant narrative of the lynching eventually disconnected from Canoa and centered on
the events as described by the UAP employees and the powerful University of Puebla
who lobbied hardly on their behalf. Many of the narratives that developed in the
lynching’s aftermath formed outside of Canoa. Noticeably absent from the
historiography is the view from Canoa’s residents.
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Many Poblanos viewed the García-Valseca-owned El Sol de Puebla newspaper as the
entity responsible for disseminating the negative views of student protestors and young
people more generally. In 1968, El Sol de Puebla functioned as a daily propagandist for
the Díaz Ordaz administration, and warned readers to the threats posed by the student
movement and its linkage to international communism. The public outcry against the
Canoa lynchings, led by the UAP employees and the UAP University Council, blamed
the press for perpetuating a culture of fear that led to the murders. The dedicated social
organizing led by the University Council pressured Puebla’s police and government to
help support the victims, and to investigate to the full extent of the law the crimes
committed against the UAP employees. It was an incredibly tense moment in Puebla.
The University Council continued its efforts to bring justice for the employees. Their
fundraising efforts helped provide financial assistance to the UAP men and the bereaved
relatives.
In Canoa’s immediate aftermath, the communal violence exposed Enrique Meza
power hold to be a paper tiger. After the lynching, many residents openly questioned
Enrique Meza’s political and religious authority, revealing the real hollowness of his
control. Meza himself visited Puebla’s military headquarters after allegations surfaced in
local newspapers that he was the mastermind responsible for the lynchings. His visit to
the military headquarters demonstrated Meza shared genuine fears about communist
insurrection, but also that he was directly connected to the political pulse of Puebla.
Meza eventually lost his position of power and was relieved of his duties by ecclesiastical
authorities in 1969. The lynching’s aftermath in Canoa revealed residents also believed
Padre Meza, and the García-Velseca newspapers were culpable for the lynching.
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Nevertheless, the subsequent police investigations into the lynchings were ultimately
failures. No high level perpetrators received prison sentences, even though the town’s
mayor and priest were known to have participated in the incident at some level. Only two
low-level indigenous participants were ever found guilty and imprisoned. Even the
reported criminals investigated and ultimately incarcerated for inciting the mob
maintained their innocence to the very end. Evidence suggests their arrest and trials were
shams concocted by the state to protect those really responsible. Future research needs to
explore the Canoa lynching’s subsequent investigation and criminal trials in greater detail
to elucidate this important chapter in the lynching’s history.
After an initial wave of scattered and fairly inaccurate press reports, the memory of
the Canoa lynching eventually faded behind Tlatelolco. However, seven years later,
Felipe Cazals resurrected the memory through his fictional film adaptation released to
Mexican audiences in 1975. In one sense, Cazals untangled the various narratives that
existed and made sense of what happened, preserving the Canoa lynching albeit in a
manner that reinforced preexisting stereotypes about the countryside. The film altered
the history and made Canoa and its residents seem backward, barbaric, ignorant, and
fanatical. These are common perceptions of el pueblo dating back hundreds of years.
The film obfuscates Canoa’s severe political and social tension and connection with the
student movement, and the national political pulse. Although Cazals alludes to some of
Canoa’s internal problems, ultimately, Canoa blurs the memory of the lynching as being
the result of religious fanaticism and manipulation, communal ignorance, backwardness,
drunkenness, and rural underdevelopment.
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Canoa obscured the larger memory of Mexico’s experience during the Cold War and
refashioned a positive image of the Mexican state. Released through CONACINE, the
state-owned film corporation, the state managed and controlled film content and
monitored movie productions and film scripts to ensure storylines were acceptable to
state interests. In many ways, Canoa reflected the political and social policies of
President Luis Echeverría, who projected an image as a populist during his sexenio from
1970-1976. Just as Echeverría spent his presidency attempting to clean his hands of
Tlatelolco, Canoa also attempted to erase the memory by creating a positive memory of
the Mexican state, as the paternal figure who acted benevolently to keep the peace during
the turbulent 1960s. The important “Phantom ‘68” scene described in chapter 3,
represents the ultimate metaphor for Echeverría’s “democratic opening” domestic policy,
and a powerful reminder to audiences attempting to comprehend the widespread
repression during the Díaz Ordaz administration. The scene recast Echeverría’s role in
1968, Tlatelolco, and during the Díaz Ordaz years by representing state power as a nonthreatening entity who dutifully allowed the general population its right to democratic
protest, albeit in a manner that never formidably challenged the Mexican state. Cazals’
powerful, documentary-style visualization of the Canoa lynching became the dominant
public memory of the lynching, and continues to influence how Mexicans perceive the
rural countryside during the Cold War.
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